An Eye for an Eye

It has been a while since my last post, but I have been busy studying for my next actuarial exam, and as Hofstadter’s Law states, “It always takes longer than you expect, even when you take into account Hofstadter’s Law.”

In my most recent post, I discussed the view of Rashbam with respect to the Written and Oral Law, specifically regarding the concept of אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו – that one must interpret the literal meaning if the Written Law, even when the literal interpretation runs counter to the Oral Law. The crux of Rashbam’s position is that while Halacha always follows the Oral Law, the Written Law was written in a way that conveys crucial lessons that cannot be ignored. A commenter, under the moniker “abh”, suggested that this may be the opinion of the Rambam in Moreh. At first I was hesitant to agree, for reasons soon to be explained, but after thinking about it, I believe that the Rambam takes a modified stance of the Rashbam’s view. First, let us see the text in question:

"עשה עונש כל פושע נגד זולתו באופן כללי שייעשה בו כאשר עשה בשוה, אם פגע בגוף פוגעים בגופו, ואם פגע בממון פוגעים בממונו, ויש לבעל הממון למחול ולסלוח. אבל הרוצח דוקא מחמת חומר פשעו אינו נסלח לו כלל, ואין לוקחין ממנו כופר, 'ולארץ לא יכפר לדם אשר שפך בה כי אם בדם שופכו'. ולפיכך אפילו נתקיים הנהרג שעה או ימים והוא מדבר ודעתו נכונה עליו, ואמר הניחו להורגי כבר מחלתי לו וסלחתי לו, אין שומעין לו, אלא 'נפש תחת נפש' בהכרח, תוך שויון קטן וגדול עבד ובן חורין החכם והסכל, כי אין בכל פגעי האדם יותר חמורה מזו. ומי שהשחית אבר מאבדים לו כמותו, "כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו". ואל תטריד את מחשבתך במה שאנו עונשין כאן בתשלומין, כי הכוונה עתה לתת טעם למקראות לא ליתן טעמים לתורה שבעל פה, עם מה שיש לי בדין זה סברא אשמיענה בעל פה. והפוגעים אשר אי אפשר לעשות כמותן בדיוק דן בהם בתשלומין, 'רק שבתו יתן ורפא ירפא'." (רמב"ם מורה הנבוכים חלק ג פרק מא)

“[The Torah] made the punishment for all [of man’s] sins against his fellow, in the general sense, which it should be done unto him exactly as what he has done. If he caused bodily affliction, we afflict his body. If he caused monetary affliction, we afflict him monetarily; except that it is within the capacity of the claimant to forgive and waive his monetary rights. However, the murderer, because of the severity of his sin, may not be forgiven, [as it states], ‘The land will not have atonement for the blood that was spilled in it, except through the blood of the one who spilled it’. Therefore, even if the victim survives for an hour or days, and he is able to speak and his mind is clear, and he says, ‘Pardon my killer, for I have already forgiven him,’ we do not listen to him. Rather, ‘a life for a life’ it must be, regardless if he is a minor or adult, slave or free man, a wise man or a fool, for there is no sin more severe than this. One who maims a limb, we should likewise maim his limb, [as it states], ‘as he places a blemish on a man, so it should be done to him’. Do not be bothered by that which we are accustomed to punish [instead] with monetary fines, because my goal now is to explain the verses [of the Written Law], not to give reasons for the Oral Law. Regarding that which I have to say about this [i.e. the Oral Law of monetary fines], I will tell you in person. Regarding those whom it is impossible to do punish them precisely as they had injured another, we should punish them with monetary fines, [as it states], ‘only for his sitting idle shall he pay, and he will be healed’”. (Translation mine; except for some verses taken from Artscroll)

At first glance it seems, especially from the part in boldface type, that the Rambam is echoing the opinion of Rashbam. Case close, end of blog post. However, the reason I hesitate to say so is because of what the Rambam writes in the introduction to his commentary on Mishna. The quote is too long to cite in its entirety, so I will select what I believe to be the most important parts, and it is to the reader to look it up and decide if I am correct or if I am quoting out of context.

"והנה זה יסוד צריך שתדענו. והוא, שהפירושים המקובלים ממשה אין בהם מחלוקת כלל, לפי שעד עכשיו לא מצאנו שנפלה מחלוקת בין החכמים בשום זמן מן הזמנים ממשה רבינו עד רב אשי שאחד אמר שמי שסימא עין אדם מסמין את עינו כמאמר ה' יתעלה עין בעין, ואחר אמר דמים בלבד הוא חייב... אבל עם היותן מקובלות ואין בהן מחלוקת הרי מדקדוק המקרא שניתן לנו אפשר ללמוד אלו הפירושים בדרכי הדין והאסמכתות והרמזים וההוראות שיש במקרא... ולמידותם שהעונש ממון הוא שחייב לשלם מי שאבד לחבירו אבר מן האיברים... וכל הדומה לזה אינו אלא לפי היסוד הזה..." (רמב"ם הקדמה לפירוש המשנה)

“…There is no dispute regarding the explanations that were passed down from Moshe, for until now we have not found a dispute among the sages from the time of Moshe Rabbeinu until Rav Ashi, [such as] that one said that one who blinds the eye of his fellow, we should blind his eye, like the word of God, ‘an eye for an eye’, while another said that he is only responsible to pay a monetary fine… Nevertheless, even though there is no dispute regarding the accepted explanations, through [independent] analysis of the text that was given to us it is possible to derive these explanations… That which they derive that one who maims the limb of his fellow only pays a monetary fine… and all similar cases, are to be understood in this fashion.” (Translation mine)

From this citation it is clear the Rambam understands that the simple interpretation of the verses of the Written Law was passed down through Moshe Rabbeinu. Hence, it is a פירוש מקובל, an interpretation passed down through mesorah, that “an eye for an eye” is not to be read literally, rather it means “the value of an eye for an eye”. As I was taught by Rabbi Chaim Ilson, a פירוש מקובל is a הפקעה from שבעים פנים לתורה – translating from Brisker terminology – although there are “seventy faces to the Torah”, and one may decipher multiple meanings to any particular verse, when we have an interpretation passed down from Moshe, there is no other meaning to the verse. When the פירוש מקובל says that פרי עץ הדר means an Esrog, and not a pomegranate or some other fruit, there is no other meaning to the words פרי עץ הדר, and to suggest otherwise is to deny the Oral Law. If this is true, how can the Rambam have suggested that the פשוטו של מקרא means that one who cuts off the limb of his fellow should have his own limb cut off, if the Rambam himself says that עין תחת עין is a פירוש מקובל that refers only to paying money? 

(See the commentary of Shem Tov. Besides for being somewhat strained in the text of the Rambam in Moreh, his shocking suggestion that עין תחת עין should be taken literally for a premeditated attacker is implicitly contradicted by the Rambam in Mishneh Torah.)

I would like to take the suggested approach of “abh”, to apply the Rashbam’s concept of the Written and Oral Law to the Rambam, but with a slight modification. According to Rashbam, both the literal and non-literal readings of the verse are sustainable. The Oral Law is to be followed in determining normative halakhic practice, whereas the literal meaning of the Written Law is used to impart eternal lessons. When it comes to the Rambam however, I would suggest that in the place of a פירוש מקובל, there is only one valid interpretation of the text. Nevertheless, it is permissible, and perhaps even necessary to ask why the text was worded that way. In our case, כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו can mean only one thing – monetary compensation. Yet we must ask, why is the text written in such a fashion? To that end, the answer is supplied by the Rambam in Mishneh Torah:

"שאם קטע יד חבירו או רגלו... ומשלם הפחת שהפחית מדמיו, שנאמר עין תחת עין, מפי השמועה למדו שזה שנאמר תחת לשלם ממון הוא. זה שנאמר בתורה כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו אינו לחבול בזה כמו שחבל בחבירו אלא שהוא ראוי לחסרו אבר או לחבול בו כמו שעשה ולפיכך משלם נזקו..." (רמב"ם הל' חובל ומזיק פרק א הלכה ב-ו)

“If he cuts off the hand of his friend or his foot… he pays the reduction of value that he caused, as it says, ‘an eye for an eye’. Tradition has taught that [the word] תחת [teaches] that one pays monetarily. That which it says in the Torah, ‘as he places a blemish on a man, so it should be done to him’ does not mean to injure him as he injured his friend. Rather it means that it would be fitting to amputate his limb or injure him as he did; therefore he pays money” (Translation mine)

Instead of simply telling us that one is liable to pay for damages caused to another man, the Torah chooses a specific language to impart the valuable lesson that the money is not compensation for damages. The Rambam calls this payment “כופר”; making amends and awarding compensation is a form of atonement – it is a way out of what the defendant truly deserves by measure of strict justice. The only question that remains is, if justice truly demands an eye for an eye, why is monetary compensation enough to achieve atonement? I hope to return to this question in my next post... to be continued.

Rashbam and Ibn Ezra on Tefillin

לז"נ ר' אבא ז"ל בן ר' יצחק אייזיק ז"ל הי"ד יאקאבאוויטש

והיה לך לאות על ידך ולזכרון בין עיניך למען תהיה תורת הוי"ה בפיך, כי ביד חזקה הוצאך הוי"ה ממצרים (שמות יג, ט)

Though it is not explicit in the language of the Written Law, Chazal teach us in the Oral Law that the intent of this verse is to the commandment of תפילין של יד ושל ראש. However, the connection of יציאת מצרים to למען תהיה תורת הוי"ה בפיך is unclear. How will the act of wearing תפילין ensure that the תורת ה' will actually remain בפיך?

Rashbam, in his commentary on this verse, rouses the ire of Ibn Ezra with a short explanation that he believes to be the פשוטו של מקרא. Rashbam writes, לפי עומק פשוטו, יהיה לך לזכרון תמיד כאילו כתוב על ידך, כעין שימני כחותם על לבך. According to this, the simple reading imparts to us that the memory of the exodus from Egypt should be ingrained in our hearts as if it was written on our hands. Ibn Ezra fiercely attacks Rashbam for this comment, though he does not mention his name, referring only to יש חולקים על אבותינו הקדושים. Although Ibn Ezra himself is willing, in many places, to explain a verse כפי פשוטו של מקרא, even at variance with an interpretation of Chazal, here he refuses to do so, because Rashbam’s interpretation is against הלכה, thus opening the door for the Karaites to reject the commandment to wear תפילין. However, apparently Rashbam had no problem with this, which begs the question – why not?

Rav Shimon Schwab explains that this comment of Rashbam evokes his general approach to פשט and דרש. (See Rashbam’s comments at the beginning of פרשת וישב and פרשת משפטים.) When it comes to הלכה, we always follow the Oral Law. Nevertheless, when coming to understand the Written Law, אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו, for to reject the simple reading would be to ignore immeasurable lessons that have been imparted to us through the Written Law. In this case, Rav Schwab notes, the פשוטו של מקרא contains a vital lesson that applies to our life daily. The Gemara (ברכות יד:) teaches that one who recites קריאת שמע without תפילין is akin to bearing false testimony.  How then, are we able to recite קריאת שמע at night, or on Shabbos and Yom Tov, when we are not wearing תפילין? For this, says Rav Schwab, we require the message of the פשוטו של מקרא, so that when we recite קריאת שמע with the memory of יציאת מצרים ingrained in our inner being, we will not be guilty of bearing false testimony.

I would suggest that the inverse of this concept is true as well. In a well-known exposition on the Rambam regarding כוונה בתפילה, Rav Chaim Soloveitchik develops the idea that תפילה, by definition, is the encounter between man and God, and therefore, תפילה without כוונה is a misnomer. If one is not cognizant of the fact that he is standing before his Creator during תפילה, he is simply muttering meaningless words. This is not תפילה; Rav Chaim terms such a person to be a מתעסק בעלמא. In a similar vein, this idea may be applied to one who wears תפילין without internalizing the message of תפילין. (See שו"ת שאגת אריה בענין היסח הדעת בתפילין) Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, in Horeb (page 178) notes that the words תפילין and תפילה derive from the same root – התפלל. In his words, “The tefillin tell you by their very name that they must achieve for you a submission of your inner self to God through the clarifying influence of a sound judgement of the ultimate values in life; that the content of the parshiyoth must be taken to heart in addition to the mere act of putting the tefillin on.” (Trans. of Dayan Grunfeld)

With this we can understand the connection in the פסוק, according to Rashbam’s פשוטו של מקרא. The תפילין are to be an אות and זכרון to be ingrained into our moral fiber. Only if the פרשיות are “as if they are sealed on your heart” will the act of donning תפילין engender a תורת ה' בפיך. Perhaps we may suggest, that while Rav Schwab explains that the פשוטו של מקרא is necessary for the moments when we are not wearing תפילין, to still have the concept of תפילין bound figuratively to our inner essence, the inverse is true as well. Even when we perform the mere act of donning תפילין, if that act does not carry with it the proper frame of mind, if we are not cognizant of the symbolism of the תפילין, it is as if we are figuratively not wearing them.

Measuring Hishtadlus - Chazon Ish (Part III)

Returning to my series that I began here and here, we have been discussing the opinion of the Chazon Ish regarding bitachon and hishtadlus. Here I present some sources that seem to indicate otherwise, and I will point out where I think my analysis and the additional sources converge and diverge.

1) Exhibit number one relates to the idea that talmidei chachamim are exempt from paying certain taxes, for instance, they are not required to contribute to the fund for a city's outer walls on the basis that talmidei chachamim are placed under God's protection and have no need for walls of fortification. At first glance, the Chazon Ish blatantly contradicts my previous two posts:

"ואחרי שבאמת תורתן מגנת עליהן ואינן נתונים תחת מקרי הטבע כשאר בני אדם, כי השגחתו ית' הוא לפי מדת הבטחון שאדם משליך יהבו על בוראו ית', והלכך ראוי תלמיד חכם לפוטרו מנטירותא". (חזון איש בבא בתרא סי' ה' ס"ק י"ח)

"... Because in truth their Torah [knowledge] guards over them, and they are not placed in the confines of nature like the rest of manking, for Divine Providence is according to the measure of trust that man throws everything to the Creator, and therefore it is proper to exempt Torah scholars from paying for protection".

It would seem that the Chazon Ish is advocating the view that bitachon can guarantee results, and therefore Torah scholars are exempt from contributing to the construction of a security fence, because they do not need such protection measures. However, this raises a number of questions. First of all, who is to say that every Torah scholar has attained such a level of bitachon to the extent that he does not need protection. Furthermore, as the Chazon Ish points out himself, even Torah scholars are not supposed to rely on miracles. In fact, this is the very question the Chazon Ish is attempting to resolve with his words that I quoted above. It would therefore seem prudent to analyze the words of the Chazon Ish in its entirety.

"...יש לעיין, הלא גם רבנן צריכין לנהוג מנהג עולם ולא לסמוך על הנס כדאמרו ברכות ל"ה ב' הנהג בהם מנהג דרך ארץ, ובשבת ל"ב א' אל יעמוד אדם במקום סכנה, ובחולין ק"ה א' אילו אבא הוי סייר נכסי כו'. ואפשר דבעיר דכולהו רבנן כופין זה את זה לבנות חומה, אבל בעיר שדרין בה בני אדם ויש ביניהם רבנן מטילין את החומה על המון העם ופוטרין את החכמים כמו שפטורין מן המס שהתורה פטרתן כיון שאינם משתדלים על השגת הממון בשביל עסקם בתורה אין ליטול מהם ממונם בשביל מס. והכי נמי, מצאו חכמים שאין ליטול מהם לנטירותא. ואחרי שבאמת תורתן מגנת עליהן ואינן נתונים תחת מקרי הטבע כשאר בני אדם, כי השגחתו ית' הוא לפי מדת הבטחטון שאדם משליך יהבו על בוראו ית', והלכך ראוי תלמיד חכם לפוטרו מנטירותא, ולהטל את החומה על שאר בני העיר לבנות חומה". (חזון איש בבא בתרא סי' ה' ס"ק י"ח)

"...This requires investigation, for are not rabbis also required to engage in worldly pursuits and not to rely on a miracle, as it is stated in... Perhaps [we may suggest] that in a city consisting of only rabbis, they may in fact force one another to [contribute] to building a wall. But in a city of laymen, and there are among them rabbis, we place [the cost] of the wall on the laymen and exempt the rabbis, just as they are exempt from taxes. Because they are not engaged in earning a livelihood and instead toil in Torah we do not charge them taxes. Here as well, the Sages decided that we should not charge them for protection. Because in truth their Torah [knowledge] guards over them, and they are not placed in the confines of nature like the rest of mankind, for Divine Providence is according to the measure of trust that man throws everything to the Creator, and therefore it is proper to exempt Torah scholars from paying for protection."

At first glance, the Chazon Ish seems to contradict himself from beginning to end. The Chazon Ish first suggests that in a city consisting of only Torah scholars, they would in fact be required to pay for protection and not rely on a miracle. Only in a city of laymen and scholars do we say that it is proper for the majority to cover the expense and exempt the elite scholars from paying because they cannot afford it. However, near the end of the paragraph the Chazon Ish contends that the scholars are not required to pay because their Torah knowledge provides protection.

I would suggest that this passage should be interpreted in light of the definition of bitachon put forth in the previous posts, namely, that bitachon and hishtadlus are inextricably connected to nature. One is required to engage in hishtadlus commensurate to what nature demands. Beyond that, bitachon is the conviction that whatever the outcome may be, it is the will of God. Therefore, in a city consisting of just Torah scholars, it would be considered relying on a miracle to have no protection measures in place. In such a case, everybody is required to contribute to protection expenses. However, in a city consisting of both scholars and laymen, it is possible for the cost of protection to be covered by the majority of laymen. In such a case, a Torah scholar is able to rely on Divine Providence, for it would does not take an open miracle to protect him once the laymen have already erected a protective fence. This is where the Chazon Ish maintains that it is proper to exempt Torah scholars from contributing to the construction of a wall. With this understanding we can proceed to the words of the Chazon Ish that follow:

"יש לעיין עד כמה חייבין בני העיר לסלק המס של רבנן, הגע עצמך, עיר שכולה רבנן ואחד הדיוט אם אתה מטיל עליו מס של כל העיר לא יספיק לו כל רכושו, ונראה דאם ע"י המס המרובה לא ישאר להם פרנסתם ויצטרכו לעזוב את העיר אין על בני העיר לסלק מס החכמים וקרוב הדבר שאינם חייבים ליתן יותר מחומש כמו בשאר מצוה כדאיתא באו"ח סי' תרנ"ו".

"It should be clarified, to what extent are the people of the city required to exempt the rabbis from taxes. Consider, a city consisting of all rabbis except for one person - if you would charge him all of the taxes for the entire city, his entire wealth would not be enough! It appears that if after [the laymen] cover all of the taxes they will not have enough left for their own livelihood, and they will be forced to leave the city, then the laymen have no responsibility to exempt the rabbis from paying taxes. It seems reasonable that they should not be required to contribute more than a fifth [of their earnings*], just like any other mitzvah."]

This section lends support to my contention - according to the Chazon Ish, Torah scholars are only exempt from paying taxes when it is financially feasible for the city to do so under natural circumstances. However, if the exemption will cause the city to rely upon a miracle, the requirement of hishtadlus kicks in.

* I translated מחומש as a fifth of their earnings, not a fifth of their total wealth, but neither of them are really an accurate translation. See Yerushalmi Peah 1:1 for more details.

2) The next example comes from a letter the Chazon Ish wrote to an unnamed recipient. Judging from the contents of the letter, it is written to a Yeshiva student, most probably not married. The recipient was facing the decision of going to a kibbutz where he knows the environment is religious, or remaining in Yeshiva for one more year, after which he does not know if he will find a religious kibbutz. The Chazon Ish writes:

"ואמנם על דעתי שאין דבר בעולם אשר ערכו ישוה לשלם מחיר לימוד התורה שנה, ובכלל אין לעזוב התורה עכשו בשביל חקור אחר העתידות [כמו שפרש"י מקרא תמים תהי' ולא תחקור אחר עתידות]..." (קובץ אגרות חלק א אגרת ה')

Although it would not surprise me if the Alter of Novhardok or the Bais HaLevi wrote this sentence, I don't believe one can conclude anything about bitachon and hishtadlus from this letter. First of all, we do not know who the recipient of the letter is or what his personal situation was at the time. Additionally, the Chazon Ish is not telling him to ignore the future indefinitely. He is telling him to remain in Yeshiva for one more year, and not to worry about the future prospects of whether or not he will be able to find a religious kibbutz the following year.

3) In another letter, the recipient seems to be faced with the decision of choosing between a kollel with a very high level of learning or something else Torah related that will earn more money (maybe taking a position as a maggid shiur somewhere? The details are not mentioned). The Chazon Ish tells him:

"ומי שתורתו אומנתו הוא בטוח מבטח עוז וכמו שנאמר ולא ראיתי וגו'. אך ביחוד אינך מזוין כ"כ לחיים של דחק ח"ו, ויש להקפיד על עתיד הקרוב לחושבו להוה ומותר לחקור עליו". (קובץ אגרות חלק א' אגרת כ"ט)

This letter is consistent with the general approach the Chazon Ish takes to bitachon and hishtadlus. On the one hand, one whose "profession is Torah" merits Divine Providence. However, in the general sense, Divine Providence is not a guarantee that everything will work out as planned. Therefore, one who chooses "Torah as a profession" should expect that he may be required to live a difficult life. In this person's case, the Chazon Ish tells him that because he is not capable of such sacrifice, hishtadlus allows him to prepare for the future as if it was the present.

I have more examples to present, but for the sake of brevity I will end the post here, thus wrapping up my three-part series on bitachon and hishtadlus in the view of the Chazon Ish. My next post will be on a different topic, iy"h.

בשם הוי"ה אל עולם

The following appears in this week's Yeshivas Ohr HaChaim "מכותלי בית המדרש", except that in the original, I put my name as מר אבא יאקאבאוויטש, thinking that it might pass through unnoticed, but the editors upgraded me to a Reb.

בס"ד פרשת וירא תשע"ו

מאת ר' אבא יאקאבאוויטש שליט"א, חבר הכולל בישיבת אור החיים

ויטע אשל בבאר שבע ויקרא שם בשם הוי"ה אל עולם. (בראשית כא, לג)

The Rambam teaches (מורה נבוכים חלק ג פרק כט, ועוד) that included in this calling of Avraham are two fundamental principles of Judaism, namely, the existence of God, connoted by the שם הוי"ה, and creation ex nihilo, as symbolized in אל עולם. Elsewhere the Rambam informs us (ריש הל' עבודה זרה) that in addition to the above, Avraham also implored the nations of the world to accept the יסוד היחוד, that the essence of God, הוי"ה, and the פועל המציאות are one and the same. Though these matters may seem to be in the realm of esoteric, a careful reading of the Rambam’s words in Mishna Torah reveals that these three fundamentals of Judaism contain practical ramifications for the daily life, nay, for the entire purpose and focus of man’s task in this world.

Beginning from הלכה ג of the opening chapter in הלכות עבודה זרה, the Rambam outlines a concise biographical sketch of Avraham. From the age of three, the young Avram had already begun to question how the world can exist without some sort of creator, and by the age of forty, his belief in God’s existence had solidified. (The Rambam thus avoids the contradictory Midrashim about Avraham’s age when he discovered God.) At that point, the Rambam writes:

"כיון שהכיר וידע התחיל להשיב תשובות על בני אור כשדים ולערוך דין עמהם ולומר שאין זו דרך האמת שאתם הולכים בה. ושיבר הצלמים והתחיל להודיע לעם שאין ראוי לעבוד אלא לאלוה העולם ולו ראוי להשתחוות ולהקריב ולנסך כדי שיכירוהו כל הברואים הבאים וראוי לאבד ולשבר כל הצורות כדי שלא יטעו בהן כל העם כמו אלו שהן מדמין שאין שם אלוה אלא אלו"

After discovering God, Avram embarked upon a quest for truth and a complete rejection of falsehood. His purpose was to convey שאין זו דרך האמת. It was necessary to destroy the idols, not because of any particular prohibition of idolatry, but simply because they were false, כדי שלא יטעו בהם... שהן מדמין שאין שם אלוה אלא אלו. And it was proper to bow and offer sacrifices and libations to the True God, not as an end in of itself, but כדי שיכירוהו כל הברואים הבאים, a means to recognizing the truth of the One God. This was the Avram of Ur Kasdim, the Avram who fought for truth in place of falsehood. However, Avram was soon to go through a metamorphosis that would completely change the direction of his life.

"כיון שגבר עליהם בראיותיו בקש המלך להורגו ונעשה לו נס ויצא לחרן, והתחיל לעמוד ולקרוא בקול גדול לכל העולם ולהודיעם שיש שם אלוה אחד לכל העולם ולו ראוי לעבוד, והיה מהלך וקורא ומקבץ העם מעיר לעיר ומממלכה לממלכה עד שהגיע לארץ כנען והוא קורא שנאמר ויקרא שם בשם י"י אל עולם, וכיון שהיו העם מתקבצין אליו ושואלין לו על דבריו היה מודיע לכל אחד ואחד כפי דעתו עד שיחזירהו לדרך האמת עד שנתקבצו אליו אלפים ורבבות והם אנשי בית אברהם ושתל בלבם העיקר הגדול הזה"

After experiencing the miracles of God in Ur Kasdim, Avraham of Charan becomes a new man. He had discovered yet another of Judaism’s fundamentals – השגחה פרטית. He began once again,  התחיל לעמוד ולקרוא בקול גדול לכל העולם ולהודיעם שיש שם אלוה אחד לכל העולם ולו ראוי לעבוד. This time, instead of arguing for the negation of false gods, Avraham argued in the positive, that there is only One True God, and it is proper to serve Him, not as a means to ensuring that truth shall prevail, but as an end in of itself. This time, instead of להשיב תשובות על בני אור כשדים, it is לקרוא בקול גדול לכל העולם. And now the call became – בשם הוי"ה אל עולם. God is not just a first being and a creator, but also a מנהיג. God is not only a matter of true or false, but a personal משגיח relatable on the level of each individual – היה מודיע לכל אחד ואחד כפי דעתו. God’s existence is not available only to the philosopher sitting in his ivory tower pondering over His existence day and night. Rather, His השגחה פרטית exists as a symbiotic relationship with each individual on a personal level.

Perhaps this can explain the change in the terminology employed by the פסוקים in this פרשת לך לך and פרשת וירא. This is not the first time that Avraham calls out in the name of God. Twice, the phrase ויקרא בשם הוי"ה appears in פרשת לך לך, without the addendum of אל עולם. But both of these appear before Avram became Avraham. It is after he becomes the אב המון גוים, and discovers the concept of השגחה פרטית, that the calling becomes בשם הוי"ה אל עולם, the calling for all of mankind to turn life’s focus to the service of God, for its own sake.

Measuring Hishtadlus - Chazon Ish (Part II)

Lining Up the Chazon Ish with Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam

I previously mentioned two levels of bitachon as explained by Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam. (Altogether he maintains that there are four levels.) The upper level is referred to as bitachon of the nevi'im, who are required to forego all hishtadlus and have complete faith in the truthfulness of prophesy. However, for those who are not nevi'im, or even a navi himself at a time when he has not received a particular prophesy, it is forbidden to have complete bitachon to the exclusion of all hishtadlus - to do so is considered to be reliant upon miracles. Rabbeinu Avrohom goes even further as to say that it is scornfully arrogant for a person to consider oneself worthy of such divine intervention.

A careful reading of the second chapter of Emuna U'Bitachon will reveal that the Chazon Ish also divided Bitachon into different levels. Most of the chapter deals with the level of the hamon am. In rejecting the Novhardok approach to bitachon, the Chazon Ish writes:

"ואין הוראה זו בבטחון נכונה, שכל שלא נתבררה בנבואה גורל העתיד אין העתיד מוכרע, כי מי יודע משפטי ה' וגמולותיו ית'" (אמונה ובטחון פרק ב אות א)

"This explanation of reliance is incorrect; as long as the future has not yet been revealed in prophecy the future is uncertain, for who knows the ways of God." (Translation mine)

The entire basis of the Chazon Ish, namely that bitachon includes the possibility of a negative outcome, so long as the bote'ach accepts it as the divine will, is predicated on this statement. As long as the future has not been revealed to man through prophecy, there is no way for man to know whether the outcome will be good or bad. The most one can do is firmly believe that whatever happens will be divinely ordained.

However, even the Chazon Ish will concede that there exists a higher level of bitachon, that of the navi. His concluding words at the end of his discussion of bitachon are as follows:

יש עוד ממדת הבטחון, כי על הבוטח שורה רוח קדש ומתלוה עמו רוח עוז המבשרו כי אמנם יעזרהו ד', וכמו שאמר דוד המלך ע"ה אם תחנה עלי מחנה לא יירא לבי אם תקום עלי מלחמה וגו', וזה ענין מתחלף לפי מעלת הבוטח ורב קדשו." (אמונה ובטחון פרק ב אות ז)

"There is more to the trait of reliance - for a holy spirit rests on the one who trusts in Hashem, accompanied by a strength of spirit that tells him that Hashem will indeed help him, as David HaMelech said, 'If you bring a host upon me, my heart will have no fear; if a war comes upon me [in this I will trust].' This matter varies according to the level of the person's trust and his degree of holiness. [In other words, the conviction of a person who has complete trust in Hashem, can indeed bring about a good outcome as opposed to a bad one.]" (Translation by Y. Goldstein, Published by Am Asefer)

Before taking issue with Yaakov Goldstein's* translation, let us focus on the line that I put in bold. The Chazon Ish does not say that the true bote'ach will merit divine intervention to ensure a positive outcome. What he does say is that the bote'ach will receive a message via ruach hakodesh, and then he will know that the outcome will be positive. In accordance with the view of Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam, it is not the bitachon which creates the desired outcome. It is the knowledge of the outcome which requires the navi (or ba'al ruach hakodesh) to have complete faith in his nevuah to the exclusion of all hishtadlus.

For this reason I take issue the translation cited above. The words "וזה ענין מתחלף לפי מעלת הבוטח" are rendered, "This matter varies according to the level of the person's trust". Contrary to the translation, I submit to you that the matter varies not according to the level of trust, but according to level of the person, whether or not he has reached a level of ruach hakodesh or not. The Chazon Ish says לפי מעלת הבוטח - not לפי מעלת הבטחון. Furthermore, the last sentence, which appears in brackets in the translation itself, does not exist in the language of the Chazon Ish, and for good reason - the Chazon Ish thinks that the notion of complete faith in a positive outcome is a טעות נושנת. It is only the ba'al ruach hakodesh who has the license to engage in complete reliance. I would therefore remove the last line of Yaakov Goldstein's translation - כל המוסיף גורע**.

Is there anything wrong with doing less hishtadlus?

I stumbled upon this fascinating tangent, in the middle of a halachic discussion regarding a dispensation made by Chazal to permit working fields during Shemita because of a potential danger. In the bracketed portion, the Chazon Ish addresses why this dispensation was necessary. After all, the Torah promises that an abundance of produce will grow in the sixth year to last throughout the Shemita year.

"ואע"ג דמשום ארנונא התירו הכל כדאמר סנהדרין כ"ו א' התם אניסי טפי ע"י המלכות וקרוב הדבר לפיקוח נפשות ע"י עניות וגביית ארנוניות, [והא דכתיב וכ"ת מה נאכל וגו' וצויתי את ברכתי, אין הכוונה הבטחה שלא תבוא לידי פיקוח נפש ע"י חסרון תבואת שנה שביעית, אלא הבטחת ברכה בשביל שמירת שביעית, ומה נאכל דכתיב, ר"ל, לא כמו שתחשוב בדרך הטבע ששביתתך תביא לך הפסד ותחיה בחיי צער אלא אצוה לך את הברכה, והבטחה זו אפשר שיגרום החטא לקפחה וגם הברכה אינה אלא לכל ישראל, אבל היחיד יוכל ללקות בשביל חברו, ומצות שביתת שביעית נדחית מפני פיקוח נפש ככל מצוות התורה בשעת מצור ומלחמה ואין להם לחם לאכול..." (הל' שביעית סימן יח אות ד)

"...And that which is written, 'and should you say, what shall we eat etc. and I will command my blessing' - that does not mean to say there is a[n absolute] guarantee that the lack of produce during the seventh year will not lead to the endangerment of life. Rather, it is a [general] blessing for keeping the [laws of] the seventh year. That which is written, 'what shall we eat' - that means to say, [it is] not as you think based on the rules of nature, that your rest [from working the land] will cause you a loss and you will live painfully - rather, I will command my blessing. [But] this promise can be negated because of sins. Furthermore, the blessing is given [generally] to all of Israel - but the individual may be afflicted because of [the sins of] his friend. The commandment of resting [the land] during the seventh year is pushed aside in a situation of life endangerment, just like all the commandments of the Torah during a time of siege and war when there is no bread to eat..." (Translation mine)

The first thing I find noteworthy in this paragraph is that the Chazon Ish uses his definition of bitachon in the middle of a strictly halachic discussion of when the laws of Shemita may be suspended due to pikuach nefesh. This is not surprising at all, as the Chazon Ish devotes most of the third chapter in Emuna U'Bitachon to driving home the point that Mussar and Halacha are inextricably linked to each other. Bitachon, through the eyes of the Chazon Ish, does not guarantee that life during Shemita will be good and easy. Although there is a blessing, the individual's sins may deem him unworthy of such a blessing.

I also find it interesting that the Chazon Ish understands the blessing of Shemita to be a general blessing to the entire Jewish nation. For that reason, one cannot rely on the havtacha because it is possible, even for the most righteous individual, to lose that blessing on account of the sins of somebody else. In order for the blessing to take effect, the nation as an entity must be deserving. Because of this, one may not rely on the blessing, and in a situation of pikuach nefesh, we are actually required to suspend the laws of Shemita and engage in the hishtadlus of planting our fields. The Chazon Ish continues:

"ובזה ניחא שהניחו כרכים מלקדש כדי שיסמכו עליהם עניים בשביעית, ולא סמכו על הבטחת ברכה בששית דודאי גם עניים בכלל הברכה, אלא שראו שגברה העניות ולא אמרה תורה לסמוך על הברכה להמנע מהשתדלות המחויבת בדרכי הטבע. ובסמ"ע סי' ס"ז סק"ב פי' כונת תוס' גיטין ל"ו ב' בהא דלא תיקנו יובל בזה"ז משום דאין רוב הציבור יכולין לעמוד שאין הברכה אלא בזמן שהוא מה"ת, ועדיין אינו מתישב בהא דלא כבשו עולי בבל והניחום כדי שיסמכו עליהם עניים בשביעית, אבל למש"כ שאין ב"ד פורשים מלעשות מה שמתחייבים בהשתדלות בשביל הציבור ובשביל עניי הציבור מפני הבטחת ברכה ניחא הכל, ומסתבר דהיתה הברכה גם בבית שני וגם אחר החורבן דב"ד שלמעלה עושין מה שגוזרין בב"ד של מטה, והברכה נאמרה אחר שעשו את ההשתדלות או במקום שנפטרו מהשתדלות, ועד כמה להשתדל מסור לחכמים ע"פ עיון התורה ברוח קדשם." (שם)

According to this we understand that which they left aside cities [in the times of Ezra] and did not sanctify them [as part of E. Israel] in order that the poor can rely on them [for food] during the seventh year, and they did not rely on the promise of blessing in the sixth year - for certainly the poor are included in the blessing. Rather, they [the Sages] saw that poverty was rampant and the Torah never required one to rely on the blessing and to withhold from the hishtadlus that is required by the laws of nature... But according to what we have written, that the Beis Din does not abstain, because of the promise of blessing, from fulfilling its requirement of hishtadlus on behalf of the community and on behalf of the poor, all is resolved... The blessing is said [only] after they have done their hishtadlus, or in a situation where they are exempt from hishtadlus. The amount of hishtadlus must be determined by the sages based on their insight into the Torah and with their holy spirit."

Here, the Chazon Ish, following from his definition of bitachon, launches straight into his understanding of hishtadlus - for they are two sides of the same coin. Being that the blessing is not guaranteed, and the possibility of a negative outcome exists - particularly in a time of rampant poverty, one may not abstain from exercising hishtadlus as measured by the laws of nature.

Also, like Rabbeinu Avrohom, who explains that one must engage in the required hishtadlus, while at the same time beseeching God in prayer that the hishtadlus bear fruit, so does the Chazon Ish; The blessing is given only after we have either fulfilled our required hishtadlus or are exempt from it.

From this we may conclude, that not only is it wrong to engage in extra hishtadlus, deemed as acts of desperation rather than the proper exertion of effort, such as in the case of Yosef, but it is equally as wrong to ignore the required hishtadlus and to do less than necessary, as in the case of Shemita.

Quick note on the Chief Butler

Somebody raised the following difficulty to my father regarding the assertion made by the Chazon Ish that it was not the nature of the Chief Butler to remember Yosef, and therefore, Yosef's petition was one of desperation rather than proper hishtadlus. My father acknowledged the difficulty, and conceded that given this midrash one cannot derive the bitachon of the Chazon Ish - but given the concept of bitachon expressed by the Chazon Ish, which he most certainly already knew before he explained the midrash - that is the way to read the midrash. The Chazon Ish could not approach the midrash in the same way the Bais HaLevi did because it would run counter to his entire formulation of bitachon.

While I agree in principle, that the Chazon Ish explained the midrash in light of his understanding of bitachon, I would like to add two more points of resolution. First, the midrash criticizes Yosef for saying v'hizkartani twice. It could be that the Chazon Ish understood that even if the Chief Butler would have remembered Yosef, the fact that Yosef reminds him not once, but twice, shows that the driving force of Yosef's actions was desperation and not hishtadlus.

Furthermore, my brother-in-law, R' Menachem Rosenbaum suggested that the Chazon Ish was basing himself on a Mishna in Avos - הוו זהירים ברשות, שאין מקרבין לו לאדם אלא לצורך עצמן נראין כאוהבין בשעת הנאתן ואין עומדין לו לאדם בשעת דחקו - Be careful with the government [officials], for they only draw people close for their own benefit but do not stand up for them during their times of need. Yosef was not dealing with any simple butler. We are talking about the שר המשקים, an important position in the kingdom of Pharaoh. Of such people we are warned that they will not stand up for you during a time of need, as they only draw people close when it serves their own political agenda. Indeed, the Chief Butler promptly forgot about Yosef - and only remembered him two years later, when he saw the opportunity to further his own political agenda, to rise to further prominence in the eyes of Pharaoh.

EDIT: It seems that the Chazon Ish had a negative attitude toward asking favors from other people, as can be seen from this letter he sent to his mother:

"הזכרתי במכתב שני על דבר... ולא מצאתי לנכון להרבות עליו בבקשות, וסמכתי למה שהיה מרגלא בפומיה דהחפץ חיים זללה"ה דמבן אדם אין מרבין לבקש." (קובץ אגרות חלק א אגרת קנח)

"I mentioned in the second letter regarding... I did not find proper to make too many requests from him, relying on that which the Chofetz Chaim often said, that from a human we do not make too many requests." (Translation mine)

In Part III of this series I will introduce other writings of the Chazon Ish that may run counter to my analysis, and we will see if I can reconcile the texts, or if I will need to start from scratch.

* By the way, Yaakov Goldstein is clearly a pseudonym - check out the letters of approbation printed at the beginning of the English version of Emuna U'Bitachon. You will notice that R' Zev Leff refers to only "the translator", R' Daniel Belsky writes a letter of approbation for R' Gedalia Spinadel, (who has translated other seforim, and obviously had what to do with this one), and refers to "המתרגם של ר' גדליה", or "the translator of R' Gedalia". Apparently the actual translator wishes to remain anonymous.

** Not that my approbation is needed, but after repudiating the words of the translator in this case, I feel obligated to say that the rest of the translation is fantastic, in my opinion. I would apply here the words that the Chazon Ish himself expressed in a letter (on an unrelated topic) - מטבע החכמים להתענג על מיתיבי יותר מתניא נמי הכי - עיין קובץ אגרות החזו"א חלק א סימן קנד.

Measuring Hishtadlus - Chazon Ish

Continuing in our series of posts on Bitachon and Hishtadlus, we now turn to the opinion of the Chazon Ish. As we have already explained, the Chazon Ish views bitachon as nothing more than the expression of emuna. As such, there is no such thing as "working on bitachon". One can only strengthen emuna, which can then be expressed as bitachon when the situation calls for it. Furthermore, bitachon does not deny the possibility of a negative outcome. Rather, it accepts the outcome, for better or worse, as the Divine will. Now, how does hishtadlus play a role?

The Chazon Ish resolves the difficulty of the midrash in a different manner than the Bais HaLevi. In the words of the Chazon Ish:

"יוסף ידע שאין הצלתו תלוי' בהשתדלות והכל מיד ה', אבל בהיות שנתחייב האדם בפעולות ולא לסמוך אניסא, חייב יוסף את עצמו לשמש בהזדמנות זו ולבקש משר המשקים, ואמנם בהיות שלפי תכונת הרהבים אין בטבעו לזכור ולהיטיב אין ראוי המעשה הזה רק מתוך יאוש, והמיואש עושה כל מה שיכול אף דברים הרחוקים מכל תועלת, אבל אין לבוטח לעשות כמו אלה ואין פעולה זו מפעולות החובה, ויש במעשה זה כעין זריית אבק על זוהר האמונה והבטחון, ואחרי שאינה חובה היא אסורה, וכונת חז"ל על הפעולה ולא על מדת הבטחון של יוסף חלילה, וידע יוסף שאין עזר מבן אדם בלתי מיד ד' לבד, אבל מה שחייב עצמו לשאול משר המשקים לא הי' לפי קבלת חז"ל דין אמת, אלא לא הי' לו לפנות אל רהבים". (אמונה ובטחון פרק ב אות ו) 

 "Yosef knew that his salvation was not dependent on any exertion on his part, and that everything comes from Hashem, but since human beings are obligated to act, and not to depend on miracles, Yosef obligated himself to make use of the opportunity and to enlist the help of the Chief Butler. But it is not the nature of people of that rank to remember and to do favors, and therefore this act of Yosef's was not appropriate - since it was an act of desperation. A desperate person does anything he can, even futile actions - which someone who trusts in Hashem should not do; he is not obligated to take such actions. This act of Yosef's, as it were, was akin to throwing dust on the glory of his faith and trust in Hashem, and since it was not obligatory, it was forbidden. Our Sages here are referring to Yosef's action, not to the extent of his trait of trust. Yosef knew that no human being could help him - only Hashem. But his feeling of obligation to ask the Chief Butler, according to the tradition of our Sages, came from a mistake in judgement; he should not have turned to untrustworthy sources of help" (Translated by Y. Goldstein, Published by Am Asefer)

Though not the topic of this post, it is noted that the Chazon Ish is prepared to attribute a mistake in judgement to Yosef, something that the Bais HaLevi somewhat softens by relegating Yosef's "sin" to nothing more than an slight imperfection of his lofty trait of bitachon. Neverthless, the Chazon Ish resolves the difficulty by saying that, indeed, Yosef was a true ba'al bitachon. However, he erred in calculating the required amount of hishtadlus. In his case, he crossed over the threshold of hishtadlus into the realm of desperation.

There exists a fine line between what the Chazon Ish considers proper hishtadlus and a lack of bitachon, and that line is drawn on the basis of nature. Hishtadlus, according to the Chazon Ish, is not measured based on the individual's level of bitachon, rather it must be measured according to the laws of nature. For this reason, whereas the Bais HaLevi speaks about when it is permitted to do hishtadlus, in order to achieve higher levels of bitachon, the Chazon Ish speaks about an obligation to do hishtadlus.

At this point, I would suggest that the Chazon Ish subscribes to the view of Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam, in his Sefer HaMaspik L'Ovdei Hashem, that there are essentially two levels of bitachon. (In reality, Rabbeinu Avrohom says there are four, but I will focus on two of them.) On the higher plane is the bitachon of nevi'im and ba'alei ruach hakodesh. Because they have received knowledge of what is to come via some form of prophesy, they are bound to follow the path of total bitachon, to the exclusion of all hishtadlus. This applies, presumably, to both the navi himself, as well as the one to whom the nevuah is addressed, be that an individual or even an entire nation. However, so long as the navi has not received knowledge of what is to come, he is required, as any other individual who is not a navi, to engage in hishtadlus, to be measured by the yardstick of nature. The bitachon of the hamon am, as well as the navi who has not received a particular nevuah, is to engage in hishtadlus, while at the same time beseeching God in prayer to allow the hishtadlus to produce the desirable outcome.

This touches upon the concept of hashgacha pratis, which I prefer to explain with the model of the statistical normal distribution. For most of the area under the bell curve, God does not actively engage in hashgacha pratis in order to arrange for the outcome He wills into being. Rather, God takes a passive role, and allows nature to run its course. But let us not forget who the Creator of nature is. Rabbeinu Avrohom refers to this concept as the סיבה ומסובב - cause and effect. When one engages in hishtadlus, a chain of causes and effects goes into play, of which God is termed the סיבה ראשונה. Starting at the original source, God caused nature to exist, He created the ability for you to do some act of hishtadlus, and that hishtadlus, hopefully, causes the result that you are looking for. However, as the architect of nature, God is able to manipulate nature to either end of the bell curve - the outcome can actually fall at the two tails of the bell curve, for better or for worse.

Using this backdrop, the Chazon Ish would define our obligation of hishtadlus to be measured with the 95%* interval situated in the centre of the bell curve, and bitachon as the expression of our belief, that no matter where in the bell curve the results actually fall, for better or for worse, it is the divine will that it should happen that way.

So that this post will not be too long, I will stop here. The next post, iy"h, will provide a couple of inferences from the words of the Chazon Ish that he actually subscribes to the view of Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam. I also hope to answer the following difficulty that somebody in Yeshiva raised against my thesis: Though I have provided explicit proof that the Chazon Ish does not allow for extra hishtadlus beyond the norm set by nature, I have yet to introduce that he likewise rejects the idea of doing less hishtadlus than the norm. There is the slight inference from the fact the Chazon Ish terms hishtadlus as a חיוב and not a היתר, but in the next post I will provide something more explicit. And before Rabbi Oppenheimer (or anybody else for that matter) jumps on me - I know what it says in Kovetz Igros and I have seen the Chazon Ish in Bava Basra.

* I arbitrarily chose 95% as an example.