Measuring Hishtadlus - Chazon Ish (Part III)

Returning to my series that I began here and here, we have been discussing the opinion of the Chazon Ish regarding bitachon and hishtadlus. Here I present some sources that seem to indicate otherwise, and I will point out where I think my analysis and the additional sources converge and diverge.

1) Exhibit number one relates to the idea that talmidei chachamim are exempt from paying certain taxes, for instance, they are not required to contribute to the fund for a city's outer walls on the basis that talmidei chachamim are placed under God's protection and have no need for walls of fortification. At first glance, the Chazon Ish blatantly contradicts my previous two posts:

"ואחרי שבאמת תורתן מגנת עליהן ואינן נתונים תחת מקרי הטבע כשאר בני אדם, כי השגחתו ית' הוא לפי מדת הבטחון שאדם משליך יהבו על בוראו ית', והלכך ראוי תלמיד חכם לפוטרו מנטירותא". (חזון איש בבא בתרא סי' ה' ס"ק י"ח)

"... Because in truth their Torah [knowledge] guards over them, and they are not placed in the confines of nature like the rest of manking, for Divine Providence is according to the measure of trust that man throws everything to the Creator, and therefore it is proper to exempt Torah scholars from paying for protection".

It would seem that the Chazon Ish is advocating the view that bitachon can guarantee results, and therefore Torah scholars are exempt from contributing to the construction of a security fence, because they do not need such protection measures. However, this raises a number of questions. First of all, who is to say that every Torah scholar has attained such a level of bitachon to the extent that he does not need protection. Furthermore, as the Chazon Ish points out himself, even Torah scholars are not supposed to rely on miracles. In fact, this is the very question the Chazon Ish is attempting to resolve with his words that I quoted above. It would therefore seem prudent to analyze the words of the Chazon Ish in its entirety.

"...יש לעיין, הלא גם רבנן צריכין לנהוג מנהג עולם ולא לסמוך על הנס כדאמרו ברכות ל"ה ב' הנהג בהם מנהג דרך ארץ, ובשבת ל"ב א' אל יעמוד אדם במקום סכנה, ובחולין ק"ה א' אילו אבא הוי סייר נכסי כו'. ואפשר דבעיר דכולהו רבנן כופין זה את זה לבנות חומה, אבל בעיר שדרין בה בני אדם ויש ביניהם רבנן מטילין את החומה על המון העם ופוטרין את החכמים כמו שפטורין מן המס שהתורה פטרתן כיון שאינם משתדלים על השגת הממון בשביל עסקם בתורה אין ליטול מהם ממונם בשביל מס. והכי נמי, מצאו חכמים שאין ליטול מהם לנטירותא. ואחרי שבאמת תורתן מגנת עליהן ואינן נתונים תחת מקרי הטבע כשאר בני אדם, כי השגחתו ית' הוא לפי מדת הבטחטון שאדם משליך יהבו על בוראו ית', והלכך ראוי תלמיד חכם לפוטרו מנטירותא, ולהטל את החומה על שאר בני העיר לבנות חומה". (חזון איש בבא בתרא סי' ה' ס"ק י"ח)

"...This requires investigation, for are not rabbis also required to engage in worldly pursuits and not to rely on a miracle, as it is stated in... Perhaps [we may suggest] that in a city consisting of only rabbis, they may in fact force one another to [contribute] to building a wall. But in a city of laymen, and there are among them rabbis, we place [the cost] of the wall on the laymen and exempt the rabbis, just as they are exempt from taxes. Because they are not engaged in earning a livelihood and instead toil in Torah we do not charge them taxes. Here as well, the Sages decided that we should not charge them for protection. Because in truth their Torah [knowledge] guards over them, and they are not placed in the confines of nature like the rest of mankind, for Divine Providence is according to the measure of trust that man throws everything to the Creator, and therefore it is proper to exempt Torah scholars from paying for protection."

At first glance, the Chazon Ish seems to contradict himself from beginning to end. The Chazon Ish first suggests that in a city consisting of only Torah scholars, they would in fact be required to pay for protection and not rely on a miracle. Only in a city of laymen and scholars do we say that it is proper for the majority to cover the expense and exempt the elite scholars from paying because they cannot afford it. However, near the end of the paragraph the Chazon Ish contends that the scholars are not required to pay because their Torah knowledge provides protection.

I would suggest that this passage should be interpreted in light of the definition of bitachon put forth in the previous posts, namely, that bitachon and hishtadlus are inextricably connected to nature. One is required to engage in hishtadlus commensurate to what nature demands. Beyond that, bitachon is the conviction that whatever the outcome may be, it is the will of God. Therefore, in a city consisting of just Torah scholars, it would be considered relying on a miracle to have no protection measures in place. In such a case, everybody is required to contribute to protection expenses. However, in a city consisting of both scholars and laymen, it is possible for the cost of protection to be covered by the majority of laymen. In such a case, a Torah scholar is able to rely on Divine Providence, for it would does not take an open miracle to protect him once the laymen have already erected a protective fence. This is where the Chazon Ish maintains that it is proper to exempt Torah scholars from contributing to the construction of a wall. With this understanding we can proceed to the words of the Chazon Ish that follow:

"יש לעיין עד כמה חייבין בני העיר לסלק המס של רבנן, הגע עצמך, עיר שכולה רבנן ואחד הדיוט אם אתה מטיל עליו מס של כל העיר לא יספיק לו כל רכושו, ונראה דאם ע"י המס המרובה לא ישאר להם פרנסתם ויצטרכו לעזוב את העיר אין על בני העיר לסלק מס החכמים וקרוב הדבר שאינם חייבים ליתן יותר מחומש כמו בשאר מצוה כדאיתא באו"ח סי' תרנ"ו".

"It should be clarified, to what extent are the people of the city required to exempt the rabbis from taxes. Consider, a city consisting of all rabbis except for one person - if you would charge him all of the taxes for the entire city, his entire wealth would not be enough! It appears that if after [the laymen] cover all of the taxes they will not have enough left for their own livelihood, and they will be forced to leave the city, then the laymen have no responsibility to exempt the rabbis from paying taxes. It seems reasonable that they should not be required to contribute more than a fifth [of their earnings*], just like any other mitzvah."]

This section lends support to my contention - according to the Chazon Ish, Torah scholars are only exempt from paying taxes when it is financially feasible for the city to do so under natural circumstances. However, if the exemption will cause the city to rely upon a miracle, the requirement of hishtadlus kicks in.

* I translated מחומש as a fifth of their earnings, not a fifth of their total wealth, but neither of them are really an accurate translation. See Yerushalmi Peah 1:1 for more details.

2) The next example comes from a letter the Chazon Ish wrote to an unnamed recipient. Judging from the contents of the letter, it is written to a Yeshiva student, most probably not married. The recipient was facing the decision of going to a kibbutz where he knows the environment is religious, or remaining in Yeshiva for one more year, after which he does not know if he will find a religious kibbutz. The Chazon Ish writes:

"ואמנם על דעתי שאין דבר בעולם אשר ערכו ישוה לשלם מחיר לימוד התורה שנה, ובכלל אין לעזוב התורה עכשו בשביל חקור אחר העתידות [כמו שפרש"י מקרא תמים תהי' ולא תחקור אחר עתידות]..." (קובץ אגרות חלק א אגרת ה')

Although it would not surprise me if the Alter of Novhardok or the Bais HaLevi wrote this sentence, I don't believe one can conclude anything about bitachon and hishtadlus from this letter. First of all, we do not know who the recipient of the letter is or what his personal situation was at the time. Additionally, the Chazon Ish is not telling him to ignore the future indefinitely. He is telling him to remain in Yeshiva for one more year, and not to worry about the future prospects of whether or not he will be able to find a religious kibbutz the following year.

3) In another letter, the recipient seems to be faced with the decision of choosing between a kollel with a very high level of learning or something else Torah related that will earn more money (maybe taking a position as a maggid shiur somewhere? The details are not mentioned). The Chazon Ish tells him:

"ומי שתורתו אומנתו הוא בטוח מבטח עוז וכמו שנאמר ולא ראיתי וגו'. אך ביחוד אינך מזוין כ"כ לחיים של דחק ח"ו, ויש להקפיד על עתיד הקרוב לחושבו להוה ומותר לחקור עליו". (קובץ אגרות חלק א' אגרת כ"ט)

This letter is consistent with the general approach the Chazon Ish takes to bitachon and hishtadlus. On the one hand, one whose "profession is Torah" merits Divine Providence. However, in the general sense, Divine Providence is not a guarantee that everything will work out as planned. Therefore, one who chooses "Torah as a profession" should expect that he may be required to live a difficult life. In this person's case, the Chazon Ish tells him that because he is not capable of such sacrifice, hishtadlus allows him to prepare for the future as if it was the present.

I have more examples to present, but for the sake of brevity I will end the post here, thus wrapping up my three-part series on bitachon and hishtadlus in the view of the Chazon Ish. My next post will be on a different topic, iy"h.

בשם הוי"ה אל עולם

The following appears in this week's Yeshivas Ohr HaChaim "מכותלי בית המדרש", except that in the original, I put my name as מר אבא יאקאבאוויטש, thinking that it might pass through unnoticed, but the editors upgraded me to a Reb.

בס"ד פרשת וירא תשע"ו

מאת ר' אבא יאקאבאוויטש שליט"א, חבר הכולל בישיבת אור החיים

ויטע אשל בבאר שבע ויקרא שם בשם הוי"ה אל עולם. (בראשית כא, לג)

The Rambam teaches (מורה נבוכים חלק ג פרק כט, ועוד) that included in this calling of Avraham are two fundamental principles of Judaism, namely, the existence of God, connoted by the שם הוי"ה, and creation ex nihilo, as symbolized in אל עולם. Elsewhere the Rambam informs us (ריש הל' עבודה זרה) that in addition to the above, Avraham also implored the nations of the world to accept the יסוד היחוד, that the essence of God, הוי"ה, and the פועל המציאות are one and the same. Though these matters may seem to be in the realm of esoteric, a careful reading of the Rambam’s words in Mishna Torah reveals that these three fundamentals of Judaism contain practical ramifications for the daily life, nay, for the entire purpose and focus of man’s task in this world.

Beginning from הלכה ג of the opening chapter in הלכות עבודה זרה, the Rambam outlines a concise biographical sketch of Avraham. From the age of three, the young Avram had already begun to question how the world can exist without some sort of creator, and by the age of forty, his belief in God’s existence had solidified. (The Rambam thus avoids the contradictory Midrashim about Avraham’s age when he discovered God.) At that point, the Rambam writes:

"כיון שהכיר וידע התחיל להשיב תשובות על בני אור כשדים ולערוך דין עמהם ולומר שאין זו דרך האמת שאתם הולכים בה. ושיבר הצלמים והתחיל להודיע לעם שאין ראוי לעבוד אלא לאלוה העולם ולו ראוי להשתחוות ולהקריב ולנסך כדי שיכירוהו כל הברואים הבאים וראוי לאבד ולשבר כל הצורות כדי שלא יטעו בהן כל העם כמו אלו שהן מדמין שאין שם אלוה אלא אלו"

After discovering God, Avram embarked upon a quest for truth and a complete rejection of falsehood. His purpose was to convey שאין זו דרך האמת. It was necessary to destroy the idols, not because of any particular prohibition of idolatry, but simply because they were false, כדי שלא יטעו בהם... שהן מדמין שאין שם אלוה אלא אלו. And it was proper to bow and offer sacrifices and libations to the True God, not as an end in of itself, but כדי שיכירוהו כל הברואים הבאים, a means to recognizing the truth of the One God. This was the Avram of Ur Kasdim, the Avram who fought for truth in place of falsehood. However, Avram was soon to go through a metamorphosis that would completely change the direction of his life.

"כיון שגבר עליהם בראיותיו בקש המלך להורגו ונעשה לו נס ויצא לחרן, והתחיל לעמוד ולקרוא בקול גדול לכל העולם ולהודיעם שיש שם אלוה אחד לכל העולם ולו ראוי לעבוד, והיה מהלך וקורא ומקבץ העם מעיר לעיר ומממלכה לממלכה עד שהגיע לארץ כנען והוא קורא שנאמר ויקרא שם בשם י"י אל עולם, וכיון שהיו העם מתקבצין אליו ושואלין לו על דבריו היה מודיע לכל אחד ואחד כפי דעתו עד שיחזירהו לדרך האמת עד שנתקבצו אליו אלפים ורבבות והם אנשי בית אברהם ושתל בלבם העיקר הגדול הזה"

After experiencing the miracles of God in Ur Kasdim, Avraham of Charan becomes a new man. He had discovered yet another of Judaism’s fundamentals – השגחה פרטית. He began once again,  התחיל לעמוד ולקרוא בקול גדול לכל העולם ולהודיעם שיש שם אלוה אחד לכל העולם ולו ראוי לעבוד. This time, instead of arguing for the negation of false gods, Avraham argued in the positive, that there is only One True God, and it is proper to serve Him, not as a means to ensuring that truth shall prevail, but as an end in of itself. This time, instead of להשיב תשובות על בני אור כשדים, it is לקרוא בקול גדול לכל העולם. And now the call became – בשם הוי"ה אל עולם. God is not just a first being and a creator, but also a מנהיג. God is not only a matter of true or false, but a personal משגיח relatable on the level of each individual – היה מודיע לכל אחד ואחד כפי דעתו. God’s existence is not available only to the philosopher sitting in his ivory tower pondering over His existence day and night. Rather, His השגחה פרטית exists as a symbiotic relationship with each individual on a personal level.

Perhaps this can explain the change in the terminology employed by the פסוקים in this פרשת לך לך and פרשת וירא. This is not the first time that Avraham calls out in the name of God. Twice, the phrase ויקרא בשם הוי"ה appears in פרשת לך לך, without the addendum of אל עולם. But both of these appear before Avram became Avraham. It is after he becomes the אב המון גוים, and discovers the concept of השגחה פרטית, that the calling becomes בשם הוי"ה אל עולם, the calling for all of mankind to turn life’s focus to the service of God, for its own sake.

Measuring Hishtadlus - Chazon Ish (Part II)

Lining Up the Chazon Ish with Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam

I previously mentioned two levels of bitachon as explained by Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam. (Altogether he maintains that there are four levels.) The upper level is referred to as bitachon of the nevi'im, who are required to forego all hishtadlus and have complete faith in the truthfulness of prophesy. However, for those who are not nevi'im, or even a navi himself at a time when he has not received a particular prophesy, it is forbidden to have complete bitachon to the exclusion of all hishtadlus - to do so is considered to be reliant upon miracles. Rabbeinu Avrohom goes even further as to say that it is scornfully arrogant for a person to consider oneself worthy of such divine intervention.

A careful reading of the second chapter of Emuna U'Bitachon will reveal that the Chazon Ish also divided Bitachon into different levels. Most of the chapter deals with the level of the hamon am. In rejecting the Novhardok approach to bitachon, the Chazon Ish writes:

"ואין הוראה זו בבטחון נכונה, שכל שלא נתבררה בנבואה גורל העתיד אין העתיד מוכרע, כי מי יודע משפטי ה' וגמולותיו ית'" (אמונה ובטחון פרק ב אות א)

"This explanation of reliance is incorrect; as long as the future has not yet been revealed in prophecy the future is uncertain, for who knows the ways of God." (Translation mine)

The entire basis of the Chazon Ish, namely that bitachon includes the possibility of a negative outcome, so long as the bote'ach accepts it as the divine will, is predicated on this statement. As long as the future has not been revealed to man through prophecy, there is no way for man to know whether the outcome will be good or bad. The most one can do is firmly believe that whatever happens will be divinely ordained.

However, even the Chazon Ish will concede that there exists a higher level of bitachon, that of the navi. His concluding words at the end of his discussion of bitachon are as follows:

יש עוד ממדת הבטחון, כי על הבוטח שורה רוח קדש ומתלוה עמו רוח עוז המבשרו כי אמנם יעזרהו ד', וכמו שאמר דוד המלך ע"ה אם תחנה עלי מחנה לא יירא לבי אם תקום עלי מלחמה וגו', וזה ענין מתחלף לפי מעלת הבוטח ורב קדשו." (אמונה ובטחון פרק ב אות ז)

"There is more to the trait of reliance - for a holy spirit rests on the one who trusts in Hashem, accompanied by a strength of spirit that tells him that Hashem will indeed help him, as David HaMelech said, 'If you bring a host upon me, my heart will have no fear; if a war comes upon me [in this I will trust].' This matter varies according to the level of the person's trust and his degree of holiness. [In other words, the conviction of a person who has complete trust in Hashem, can indeed bring about a good outcome as opposed to a bad one.]" (Translation by Y. Goldstein, Published by Am Asefer)

Before taking issue with Yaakov Goldstein's* translation, let us focus on the line that I put in bold. The Chazon Ish does not say that the true bote'ach will merit divine intervention to ensure a positive outcome. What he does say is that the bote'ach will receive a message via ruach hakodesh, and then he will know that the outcome will be positive. In accordance with the view of Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam, it is not the bitachon which creates the desired outcome. It is the knowledge of the outcome which requires the navi (or ba'al ruach hakodesh) to have complete faith in his nevuah to the exclusion of all hishtadlus.

For this reason I take issue the translation cited above. The words "וזה ענין מתחלף לפי מעלת הבוטח" are rendered, "This matter varies according to the level of the person's trust". Contrary to the translation, I submit to you that the matter varies not according to the level of trust, but according to level of the person, whether or not he has reached a level of ruach hakodesh or not. The Chazon Ish says לפי מעלת הבוטח - not לפי מעלת הבטחון. Furthermore, the last sentence, which appears in brackets in the translation itself, does not exist in the language of the Chazon Ish, and for good reason - the Chazon Ish thinks that the notion of complete faith in a positive outcome is a טעות נושנת. It is only the ba'al ruach hakodesh who has the license to engage in complete reliance. I would therefore remove the last line of Yaakov Goldstein's translation - כל המוסיף גורע**.

Is there anything wrong with doing less hishtadlus?

I stumbled upon this fascinating tangent, in the middle of a halachic discussion regarding a dispensation made by Chazal to permit working fields during Shemita because of a potential danger. In the bracketed portion, the Chazon Ish addresses why this dispensation was necessary. After all, the Torah promises that an abundance of produce will grow in the sixth year to last throughout the Shemita year.

"ואע"ג דמשום ארנונא התירו הכל כדאמר סנהדרין כ"ו א' התם אניסי טפי ע"י המלכות וקרוב הדבר לפיקוח נפשות ע"י עניות וגביית ארנוניות, [והא דכתיב וכ"ת מה נאכל וגו' וצויתי את ברכתי, אין הכוונה הבטחה שלא תבוא לידי פיקוח נפש ע"י חסרון תבואת שנה שביעית, אלא הבטחת ברכה בשביל שמירת שביעית, ומה נאכל דכתיב, ר"ל, לא כמו שתחשוב בדרך הטבע ששביתתך תביא לך הפסד ותחיה בחיי צער אלא אצוה לך את הברכה, והבטחה זו אפשר שיגרום החטא לקפחה וגם הברכה אינה אלא לכל ישראל, אבל היחיד יוכל ללקות בשביל חברו, ומצות שביתת שביעית נדחית מפני פיקוח נפש ככל מצוות התורה בשעת מצור ומלחמה ואין להם לחם לאכול..." (הל' שביעית סימן יח אות ד)

"...And that which is written, 'and should you say, what shall we eat etc. and I will command my blessing' - that does not mean to say there is a[n absolute] guarantee that the lack of produce during the seventh year will not lead to the endangerment of life. Rather, it is a [general] blessing for keeping the [laws of] the seventh year. That which is written, 'what shall we eat' - that means to say, [it is] not as you think based on the rules of nature, that your rest [from working the land] will cause you a loss and you will live painfully - rather, I will command my blessing. [But] this promise can be negated because of sins. Furthermore, the blessing is given [generally] to all of Israel - but the individual may be afflicted because of [the sins of] his friend. The commandment of resting [the land] during the seventh year is pushed aside in a situation of life endangerment, just like all the commandments of the Torah during a time of siege and war when there is no bread to eat..." (Translation mine)

The first thing I find noteworthy in this paragraph is that the Chazon Ish uses his definition of bitachon in the middle of a strictly halachic discussion of when the laws of Shemita may be suspended due to pikuach nefesh. This is not surprising at all, as the Chazon Ish devotes most of the third chapter in Emuna U'Bitachon to driving home the point that Mussar and Halacha are inextricably linked to each other. Bitachon, through the eyes of the Chazon Ish, does not guarantee that life during Shemita will be good and easy. Although there is a blessing, the individual's sins may deem him unworthy of such a blessing.

I also find it interesting that the Chazon Ish understands the blessing of Shemita to be a general blessing to the entire Jewish nation. For that reason, one cannot rely on the havtacha because it is possible, even for the most righteous individual, to lose that blessing on account of the sins of somebody else. In order for the blessing to take effect, the nation as an entity must be deserving. Because of this, one may not rely on the blessing, and in a situation of pikuach nefesh, we are actually required to suspend the laws of Shemita and engage in the hishtadlus of planting our fields. The Chazon Ish continues:

"ובזה ניחא שהניחו כרכים מלקדש כדי שיסמכו עליהם עניים בשביעית, ולא סמכו על הבטחת ברכה בששית דודאי גם עניים בכלל הברכה, אלא שראו שגברה העניות ולא אמרה תורה לסמוך על הברכה להמנע מהשתדלות המחויבת בדרכי הטבע. ובסמ"ע סי' ס"ז סק"ב פי' כונת תוס' גיטין ל"ו ב' בהא דלא תיקנו יובל בזה"ז משום דאין רוב הציבור יכולין לעמוד שאין הברכה אלא בזמן שהוא מה"ת, ועדיין אינו מתישב בהא דלא כבשו עולי בבל והניחום כדי שיסמכו עליהם עניים בשביעית, אבל למש"כ שאין ב"ד פורשים מלעשות מה שמתחייבים בהשתדלות בשביל הציבור ובשביל עניי הציבור מפני הבטחת ברכה ניחא הכל, ומסתבר דהיתה הברכה גם בבית שני וגם אחר החורבן דב"ד שלמעלה עושין מה שגוזרין בב"ד של מטה, והברכה נאמרה אחר שעשו את ההשתדלות או במקום שנפטרו מהשתדלות, ועד כמה להשתדל מסור לחכמים ע"פ עיון התורה ברוח קדשם." (שם)

According to this we understand that which they left aside cities [in the times of Ezra] and did not sanctify them [as part of E. Israel] in order that the poor can rely on them [for food] during the seventh year, and they did not rely on the promise of blessing in the sixth year - for certainly the poor are included in the blessing. Rather, they [the Sages] saw that poverty was rampant and the Torah never required one to rely on the blessing and to withhold from the hishtadlus that is required by the laws of nature... But according to what we have written, that the Beis Din does not abstain, because of the promise of blessing, from fulfilling its requirement of hishtadlus on behalf of the community and on behalf of the poor, all is resolved... The blessing is said [only] after they have done their hishtadlus, or in a situation where they are exempt from hishtadlus. The amount of hishtadlus must be determined by the sages based on their insight into the Torah and with their holy spirit."

Here, the Chazon Ish, following from his definition of bitachon, launches straight into his understanding of hishtadlus - for they are two sides of the same coin. Being that the blessing is not guaranteed, and the possibility of a negative outcome exists - particularly in a time of rampant poverty, one may not abstain from exercising hishtadlus as measured by the laws of nature.

Also, like Rabbeinu Avrohom, who explains that one must engage in the required hishtadlus, while at the same time beseeching God in prayer that the hishtadlus bear fruit, so does the Chazon Ish; The blessing is given only after we have either fulfilled our required hishtadlus or are exempt from it.

From this we may conclude, that not only is it wrong to engage in extra hishtadlus, deemed as acts of desperation rather than the proper exertion of effort, such as in the case of Yosef, but it is equally as wrong to ignore the required hishtadlus and to do less than necessary, as in the case of Shemita.

Quick note on the Chief Butler

Somebody raised the following difficulty to my father regarding the assertion made by the Chazon Ish that it was not the nature of the Chief Butler to remember Yosef, and therefore, Yosef's petition was one of desperation rather than proper hishtadlus. My father acknowledged the difficulty, and conceded that given this midrash one cannot derive the bitachon of the Chazon Ish - but given the concept of bitachon expressed by the Chazon Ish, which he most certainly already knew before he explained the midrash - that is the way to read the midrash. The Chazon Ish could not approach the midrash in the same way the Bais HaLevi did because it would run counter to his entire formulation of bitachon.

While I agree in principle, that the Chazon Ish explained the midrash in light of his understanding of bitachon, I would like to add two more points of resolution. First, the midrash criticizes Yosef for saying v'hizkartani twice. It could be that the Chazon Ish understood that even if the Chief Butler would have remembered Yosef, the fact that Yosef reminds him not once, but twice, shows that the driving force of Yosef's actions was desperation and not hishtadlus.

Furthermore, my brother-in-law, R' Menachem Rosenbaum suggested that the Chazon Ish was basing himself on a Mishna in Avos - הוו זהירים ברשות, שאין מקרבין לו לאדם אלא לצורך עצמן נראין כאוהבין בשעת הנאתן ואין עומדין לו לאדם בשעת דחקו - Be careful with the government [officials], for they only draw people close for their own benefit but do not stand up for them during their times of need. Yosef was not dealing with any simple butler. We are talking about the שר המשקים, an important position in the kingdom of Pharaoh. Of such people we are warned that they will not stand up for you during a time of need, as they only draw people close when it serves their own political agenda. Indeed, the Chief Butler promptly forgot about Yosef - and only remembered him two years later, when he saw the opportunity to further his own political agenda, to rise to further prominence in the eyes of Pharaoh.

EDIT: It seems that the Chazon Ish had a negative attitude toward asking favors from other people, as can be seen from this letter he sent to his mother:

"הזכרתי במכתב שני על דבר... ולא מצאתי לנכון להרבות עליו בבקשות, וסמכתי למה שהיה מרגלא בפומיה דהחפץ חיים זללה"ה דמבן אדם אין מרבין לבקש." (קובץ אגרות חלק א אגרת קנח)

"I mentioned in the second letter regarding... I did not find proper to make too many requests from him, relying on that which the Chofetz Chaim often said, that from a human we do not make too many requests." (Translation mine)

In Part III of this series I will introduce other writings of the Chazon Ish that may run counter to my analysis, and we will see if I can reconcile the texts, or if I will need to start from scratch.

* By the way, Yaakov Goldstein is clearly a pseudonym - check out the letters of approbation printed at the beginning of the English version of Emuna U'Bitachon. You will notice that R' Zev Leff refers to only "the translator", R' Daniel Belsky writes a letter of approbation for R' Gedalia Spinadel, (who has translated other seforim, and obviously had what to do with this one), and refers to "המתרגם של ר' גדליה", or "the translator of R' Gedalia". Apparently the actual translator wishes to remain anonymous.

** Not that my approbation is needed, but after repudiating the words of the translator in this case, I feel obligated to say that the rest of the translation is fantastic, in my opinion. I would apply here the words that the Chazon Ish himself expressed in a letter (on an unrelated topic) - מטבע החכמים להתענג על מיתיבי יותר מתניא נמי הכי - עיין קובץ אגרות החזו"א חלק א סימן קנד.

Measuring Hishtadlus - Chazon Ish

Continuing in our series of posts on Bitachon and Hishtadlus, we now turn to the opinion of the Chazon Ish. As we have already explained, the Chazon Ish views bitachon as nothing more than the expression of emuna. As such, there is no such thing as "working on bitachon". One can only strengthen emuna, which can then be expressed as bitachon when the situation calls for it. Furthermore, bitachon does not deny the possibility of a negative outcome. Rather, it accepts the outcome, for better or worse, as the Divine will. Now, how does hishtadlus play a role?

The Chazon Ish resolves the difficulty of the midrash in a different manner than the Bais HaLevi. In the words of the Chazon Ish:

"יוסף ידע שאין הצלתו תלוי' בהשתדלות והכל מיד ה', אבל בהיות שנתחייב האדם בפעולות ולא לסמוך אניסא, חייב יוסף את עצמו לשמש בהזדמנות זו ולבקש משר המשקים, ואמנם בהיות שלפי תכונת הרהבים אין בטבעו לזכור ולהיטיב אין ראוי המעשה הזה רק מתוך יאוש, והמיואש עושה כל מה שיכול אף דברים הרחוקים מכל תועלת, אבל אין לבוטח לעשות כמו אלה ואין פעולה זו מפעולות החובה, ויש במעשה זה כעין זריית אבק על זוהר האמונה והבטחון, ואחרי שאינה חובה היא אסורה, וכונת חז"ל על הפעולה ולא על מדת הבטחון של יוסף חלילה, וידע יוסף שאין עזר מבן אדם בלתי מיד ד' לבד, אבל מה שחייב עצמו לשאול משר המשקים לא הי' לפי קבלת חז"ל דין אמת, אלא לא הי' לו לפנות אל רהבים". (אמונה ובטחון פרק ב אות ו) 

 "Yosef knew that his salvation was not dependent on any exertion on his part, and that everything comes from Hashem, but since human beings are obligated to act, and not to depend on miracles, Yosef obligated himself to make use of the opportunity and to enlist the help of the Chief Butler. But it is not the nature of people of that rank to remember and to do favors, and therefore this act of Yosef's was not appropriate - since it was an act of desperation. A desperate person does anything he can, even futile actions - which someone who trusts in Hashem should not do; he is not obligated to take such actions. This act of Yosef's, as it were, was akin to throwing dust on the glory of his faith and trust in Hashem, and since it was not obligatory, it was forbidden. Our Sages here are referring to Yosef's action, not to the extent of his trait of trust. Yosef knew that no human being could help him - only Hashem. But his feeling of obligation to ask the Chief Butler, according to the tradition of our Sages, came from a mistake in judgement; he should not have turned to untrustworthy sources of help" (Translated by Y. Goldstein, Published by Am Asefer)

Though not the topic of this post, it is noted that the Chazon Ish is prepared to attribute a mistake in judgement to Yosef, something that the Bais HaLevi somewhat softens by relegating Yosef's "sin" to nothing more than an slight imperfection of his lofty trait of bitachon. Neverthless, the Chazon Ish resolves the difficulty by saying that, indeed, Yosef was a true ba'al bitachon. However, he erred in calculating the required amount of hishtadlus. In his case, he crossed over the threshold of hishtadlus into the realm of desperation.

There exists a fine line between what the Chazon Ish considers proper hishtadlus and a lack of bitachon, and that line is drawn on the basis of nature. Hishtadlus, according to the Chazon Ish, is not measured based on the individual's level of bitachon, rather it must be measured according to the laws of nature. For this reason, whereas the Bais HaLevi speaks about when it is permitted to do hishtadlus, in order to achieve higher levels of bitachon, the Chazon Ish speaks about an obligation to do hishtadlus.

At this point, I would suggest that the Chazon Ish subscribes to the view of Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam, in his Sefer HaMaspik L'Ovdei Hashem, that there are essentially two levels of bitachon. (In reality, Rabbeinu Avrohom says there are four, but I will focus on two of them.) On the higher plane is the bitachon of nevi'im and ba'alei ruach hakodesh. Because they have received knowledge of what is to come via some form of prophesy, they are bound to follow the path of total bitachon, to the exclusion of all hishtadlus. This applies, presumably, to both the navi himself, as well as the one to whom the nevuah is addressed, be that an individual or even an entire nation. However, so long as the navi has not received knowledge of what is to come, he is required, as any other individual who is not a navi, to engage in hishtadlus, to be measured by the yardstick of nature. The bitachon of the hamon am, as well as the navi who has not received a particular nevuah, is to engage in hishtadlus, while at the same time beseeching God in prayer to allow the hishtadlus to produce the desirable outcome.

This touches upon the concept of hashgacha pratis, which I prefer to explain with the model of the statistical normal distribution. For most of the area under the bell curve, God does not actively engage in hashgacha pratis in order to arrange for the outcome He wills into being. Rather, God takes a passive role, and allows nature to run its course. But let us not forget who the Creator of nature is. Rabbeinu Avrohom refers to this concept as the סיבה ומסובב - cause and effect. When one engages in hishtadlus, a chain of causes and effects goes into play, of which God is termed the סיבה ראשונה. Starting at the original source, God caused nature to exist, He created the ability for you to do some act of hishtadlus, and that hishtadlus, hopefully, causes the result that you are looking for. However, as the architect of nature, God is able to manipulate nature to either end of the bell curve - the outcome can actually fall at the two tails of the bell curve, for better or for worse.

Using this backdrop, the Chazon Ish would define our obligation of hishtadlus to be measured with the 95%* interval situated in the centre of the bell curve, and bitachon as the expression of our belief, that no matter where in the bell curve the results actually fall, for better or for worse, it is the divine will that it should happen that way.

So that this post will not be too long, I will stop here. The next post, iy"h, will provide a couple of inferences from the words of the Chazon Ish that he actually subscribes to the view of Rabbeinu Avrohom ben HaRambam. I also hope to answer the following difficulty that somebody in Yeshiva raised against my thesis: Though I have provided explicit proof that the Chazon Ish does not allow for extra hishtadlus beyond the norm set by nature, I have yet to introduce that he likewise rejects the idea of doing less hishtadlus than the norm. There is the slight inference from the fact the Chazon Ish terms hishtadlus as a חיוב and not a היתר, but in the next post I will provide something more explicit. And before Rabbi Oppenheimer (or anybody else for that matter) jumps on me - I know what it says in Kovetz Igros and I have seen the Chazon Ish in Bava Basra.

* I arbitrarily chose 95% as an example.

Measuring Hishtadlus - Bais HaLevi's Approach

In the previous post I set out to explain two alternative approaches to bitachon. What I (somewhat inaccurately, but intentionally) termed the Novhardok approach is the belief that everything will turn out, with God's help, to be good. The Chazon Ish, on the other hand, flatly rejects this approach, and explains bitachon to be the expression of emuna - the absolute conviction that nothing in this world is a coincidence - everything, both good and bad, is controlled by God. (How much is controlled by God directly and how much God leaves to nature is not the topic of this series of posts.) Now we turn to the concept of Hishtadlus (effort).

The Torah relates that Yosef remained in prison for two years after the episode in which he interpreted the dreams of the royal butler and baker of Pharaoh. The Midrash explains that these two years were a punishment a seemingly minor infraction - the attempt to enlist the royal butler to help him get out of jail. This act on Yosef's part was considered to be a lack of bitachon, as he should have simply relied on God and not mentioned anything to the butler. The obvious difficulty with this Midrash is its conflict with the concept of hishtadlus. Does it not make sense that Yosef should have been required to exert some minimal effort (hishtadlus), in this case the enlistment of the royal butler, and then pray to God for his efforts to come to fruition (bitachon)? Or perhaps the concepts of bitachon and hishtadlus are at loggerheads with each other, and the Midrash is requiring us to eschew hishtadlus in toto, and turn to God with complete bitachon and nothing else?

Before resolving these issues, it is necessary to see the text of the Midrash, which, at first glance, seems to only make things worse. Commenting on the verse "אשרי הגבר אשר שם ה' מבטחו ולא פנה אל רהבים" the Midrash states:

"אשרי הגבר אשר שם ה' מבטחו, זה יוסף, ולא פנה אל רהבים, ע"י שאמר לשר המשקים זכרתני והזכרתני ניתוסף לו שתי שנים" (בראשית רבה פרשת מקץ פרשה פט)

"'Praiseworthy is the man who places his trust in God': This is [a reference to] Yosef. 'And he does not turn to the haughty': Because he said to the butler 'remember me' twice, two years were added to his [sentence]".

At first glance this Midrash is completely incoherent; the contradiction is blatant. How can one proclaim, in one breath, that אשרי הגבר אשר שם ה' מבטחו is a reference to Yosef, making him the quintessential ba'al bitachon, while at the same time condemning him to an extra two years in prison because of his lack of bitachon?

The Bais HaLevi (on Parshas Miketz) offers an interpretation of the Midrash based upon his analysis of the interplay between the two concepts of bitachon and hishtadlus. Ideally, the Bais HaLevi writes, one should be completely reliant on God and have no reason for hishtadlus. However, being that most people have not achieved such a high level of bitachon, the Torah permits us to exert effort in worldly matters in order to enable us to eventually reach higher levels of bitachon. Essentially, hishtadlus and bitachon have an inverse relationship. As man exerts the correct amount of hishtadlus, and comes to the realization that it is really God who allows his efforts to bear fruit, he begins to rely more on God and less on his own effort. On the other hand, if man exerts too much effort, he will begin to only believe in himself - כחי ועצם ידי - and his level of bitachon will diminish. The goal is to achieve such a level of bitachon that hishtadlus is deemed completely unnecessary.

According to this understanding, it stands to reason that the measure of proper hishtadlus does not depend upon external factors, such as the economy or geographical location. Rather, it depends upon the person. The yardstick for measuring hishtadlus is the individual's level of bitachon.

With this in mind, the Bais HaLevi is able to explain both statements of the Midrash. Yosef's "lack" of bitachon was displayed through his request of the butler to remember him and mention his name to Pharaoh. In fact, a careful look at what Yosef said will reveal that he didn't even make a request! He simply said, as part of his interpretation of the butler's dream, "והזכרתני אל פרעה". Nevertheless, Yosef was punished with two extra years in prison, for this seemingly minor infraction. It is with this understanding that the Midrash can exclaim, אשרי הגבר אשר יבטח בשם, praiseworthy is Yosef, who embodies the trait of bitachon - precisely because he was punished for this minor act of hishtadlus. The very fact that he was held accountable for this act is testimony to his lofty trait of bitachon.

Based on this analysis, hishtadlus has been essentially diminished. It serves no purpose in and of itself, except as a means to attaining higher levels of bitachon. If one were to ask, "does my hishtadlus actually achieve anything?", the answer would be a resounding "no". This is why the Bais HaLevi makes no mention of a חיוב השתדלות - a requirement to exert effort, like many other commentators. Rather, he stress that there exists a היתר השתדלות - permission to exert effort, temporarily, until one becomes a true ba'al bitachon. From this we may conclude that the Bais HaLevi follows what we originally termed the Novhardok approach to bitachon. Bitachon is the belief that God will take care of all of your needs - in the end all will turn out good. The true ba'al bitachon, therefore, has no reason for hishtadlus. Only one who is lacking true bitachon is allowed to perform hishtadlus in order to eventually attain loftier levels of reliance on God.

In the next post, I hope to examine the manner in which the Chazon Ish interprets the Midrash about Yosef, and how it relates to his definition on bitachon.

Bitachon - Two Approaches

After a brief summer hiatus, during which I passed my first actuarial exam (a dream vacation for a mathematician!), I am returning with a post presenting two approaches to the concept of Bitachon, and in a follow-up post, I will explore how each one relates to the concept of Hishtadlus.

Bitachon is commonly understood to be the conviction that, in every circumstance one finds oneself, its outcome will be positive. The most extreme adherents of this school of thought go so far as to say that Bitachon alone can produce the desired result. (For now I will refer to this as the Novhardok approach to bitachon, though it is not exclusive to Novhardok. A complete analysis of the Alter of Novhardok's approach to bitachon will need to wait until I can sift through the many pages recorded from his lectures in Sefer Madregas HaAdam.)

However, the Chazon Ish vehemently disagrees with this approach, to the point that he grants it no credence at all. He begins his chapter on Bitachon as follows:

"טעות נושנת נתאזרחה בלב רבים במושג בטחון. שם בטחון המשמש למדה מהוללה ועיקרי בפי החסידים, נסתובבה במושג חובה להאמין - בכל מקרה שפוגש האדם והעמידתו לקראת עתיד בלתי מוכרע ושני דרכים בעתיד, אחת טובה ולא שניה - כי בטח יהיה הטוב, ואם מסתפק וחושש על היפוך הטוב הוא מחוסר בטחון". (אמונה ובטחון פרק ב אות א)

"There is an old misconception rooted in the hearts of many when it comes to the concept of trust in Hashem [known as bitachon]. This term, used by the righteous to name a celebrated and central character trait, has undergone a change, and has mistakenly become a term to describe the obligation to believe in any situation a person finds himself in where he faces an undecided future with two ways apparent - one good and the other not - that surely the good outcome will be the one to occur; if one is doubtful and fears the possibility of the opposite of good occuring, he is lacking in trust in Hashem". (Translation taken from Y. Goldstein, published by Am Asefer)

Instead, the Chazon Ish explains, bitachon is the absolute conviction that all happenings, for better or for worse, are the result of the Divine will. No outcome may be dismissed as a coincidence. According to the Chazon Ish, bitachon (reliance) is nothing more than an extension of one's emuna (belief). Emuna describes the inner convictions of belief in the existence of God. Bitachon is the expression of that belief in actuality. In the words of the Chazon Ish:

"ולהאמור האמונה והבטחון אחת היא, רק האמונה היא המבט הכללי של בעליה, והבטחון המבט של המאמין על עצמו, האמונה בבחינת הלכה, והבטחון בבחינת מעשה" (אמונה ובטחון פרק ב אות ב)

 "According to that which was said [above] belief and reliance are inseparable, except that belief is the general worldview of the believer, whereas reliance is his approach to his personal life. Faith is the theory; reliance the practice". (My Translation)

It is of importance to note a major distinction between the Novhardok approach and that of the Chazon Ish. According to the Chazon Ish, reliance is the expression of one's inner faith. It stands to reason that commensurate to the strength of one's faith will be his reliance. Furthermore, the atheist has no claim to any level of bitachon - the denial of God's existence precludes the possibility of relying on Him. On the other hand, according the Novhardok approach emuna and bitachon are two distinct beliefs - emuna being the belief in God's existence and bitachon being the belief that the outcome will be positive. For the ma'amin, his bitachon will be expressed as the belief that God will cause the desired result; for the atheist, bitachon is simply the idea we refer to as "optimism". We may term Novhardok bitachon to be Divine optimism. (I mentioned above that the most extreme followers of the Novhardok approach believe that true bitachon can actually produce desired outcomes. It is interesting to note that even for the atheist, optimism in general may be helpful in producing better outcomes.)

In my next post, I hope to explore the concept of hishtadlus, specifically in how it should be viewed according to these two approaches.

Techeiles - Is a Specific Chilazon Required?

In the last post, I discussed the potential of rediscovering the חלזון התכלת in this day and age. For one who accepts the argument of R' Soloveitchik, the debate is entirely academic, and even if you could ascertain what the חלזון is, there would be no practical application, and you would continue to wear only white strings on your ציצית. If you accept the alternative approach, which rejected the Radziner תכלת only because of a negative-מסורה, then there is a potential practical application, should you find a חלזון that has no problem of a negative-מסורה. With respect to the Murex Trunculus, which is commonly used today as the source of תכלת, we can ask two questions:

1. Is the Murex Trunculus the חלזון that was used in the times of Chazal to produce תכלת?
2. In the event it is not the actual species that was used, is it kosher to be used to produce תכלת? In other words, when the תורה says that תכלת must come from a חלזון, is that referring to a specific חלזון, or could you use any species that classifies as a חלזון, assuming there exists such a species?

Let us begin by examining a Tosefta in the ninth chapter of Menachos:

"תכלת אין כשרה אלא מן החלזון, הביא שלא מן החלזון פסולה"

"Techeiles is not kosher unless it is from the Chilazon. If one brought [techeiles] which is not from the Chilazon it is invalid". 

The Tosefta is very particular in stating both the conditional and its converse. Not only do we stress that תכלת from a חלזון is valid, we stress that if it comes from a different creature it is invalid.

Now, let us explore our options. Either there exists only one creature named "חלזון" in the universe, or it is a generic name, and there may be two or more types of חלזון. Suppose for a moment that exist two or more חלזונות in the world. In that case, they are certainly both valid for תכלת, for if one was valid and the other invalid, the Tosefta could never have made a statement such as the one above. Alternatively, suppose there is only one type of חלזון in the world. In that case, should you discover a creature that classifies as חלזון, you can be certain you have discovered the חלזון התכלת. But we can safely reject this possibility, as we know of at least three types of חלזון:

1. The חלזון התכלת, which lives in the sea.
2. The Talmud in Sanhedrin (91a), in a completely different context states, "Go up to the mountain and see - today there is but one חלזון. Tomorrow it will rain, and the mountain will be filled with חלזונות. The Yad Ramah (ad. loc.) comments, "It is logical that this Chilazon is not the one mentioned with respect to Techeiles... Rather it is logical that we speak here of a different species... It is called in Arabic 'Chalzum'"
3. The Ritva (Shabbos 75a) mentions a third type of חלזון in the context of the laws of killing an חלזון on Shabbos - "The Chilazon is differen since it has no limbs. Rather it is a sealed body, like the Chilazon [that lives] in the garbage dumps.

This leads us to the conclusion that חלזון is a generic term, in which case, any species of חלזון that produces a תכלת dye (with specific requirements which we will not address here at this time) must be valid as per the aforementioned Tosefta. The same conclusion can be drawn from the following story recorded in the Talmud (Menachos 43a):

"מר ממשכי אייתי תכלתא בשני רב אחאי, בדקוה בדרב יצחק בדר"י ואיפרד חזותיה, בדרב אדא ואישתני למעליותא. סבר למפסלה. אמר להו רב אחאי, אלא הא לא תכילתא היא ולא קלא אילן היא?! אלא שמע מינה שמועתא אהדדי איתמר, היכא דבדקנא בדרב יצחק בריה דרב יהודה לא איפרד חזותיה כשרה, איפרד חזותיה, בדקינן לה בדרב אדא בחמירא ארכסא, אישתני למעליותא כשרה, לגריעותא פסולה"

"Mar of Mischi, brought Techeiles in the days of Rav Achai. When subjected to the test of Rav Yitzchak it faded [i.e. failed], but when subjected to the test of Rav Ada [its colour] improved [i.e. passed]. Rav Achai exclaimed, 'This is neither Techeiles or plant indigo?!' Rather, both tests are used together. [First] when you subject it to the test of R' Yitzchak, it its colour does not fade it is valid. If it fades, then subject it to the test of R' Ada. If it improves, it is valid, if it fades [more] it is invalid".

We see from this Gemara, that any fabric dyed the colour of תכלת was assumed to be either plant indigo (i.e. invalid) or authentic תכלת. This is so, to the extent that Rav Achai was flabbergasted when the fabric passed one test, but not the second. From this they concluded that the two tests (which are described in the Gemara there) are to be used in tandem. From this we may conclude, that any dye that we know was used in the times of the Gemara to produce תכלת-coloured garments, as long as it can be proven that it is not plant indigo, can be assumed to be valid for תכלת. Otherwise, Rav Achai would have been worried that the תכלת-dye came from a חלזון that is invalid.

That leaves us with two questions, to be addressed in future posts: Is the Murex Trunculus the חלזון that was used in the times of Chazal for producing תכלת? And if not, does it classify as a species of חלזון, in which case it is valid, regardless of what the historical חלזון התכלת was? If you answer yes to either of the above, then you should be wearing תכלת on your ציצית, unless of course you accept the מסורה argument, in which case, even if it was valid, you wouldn't wear it because your father didn't, שאל אביך ויגדך*.

* On the topic of שאל אביך ויגדך, my father suggested that R' Soloveitchik's argument works only when there is a מקום ספק. When there is some degree of uncertainty, the default position follows מסורה**. But if there would be 100% conclusive evidence that the Murex is valid for תכלת, even R' Soloveitchik would agree. (I would add, that for R' Soloveitchik, 100% evidence would need to include 100% halachic evidence.)

** The implicit assumption in my father's suggestion is that the מסורה of שאל אביך ויגדך is a הכרעה, not a בירור.

Mesora and Techeiles

In honour (I still spell it the Canadian way) of this week's parsha, I present one argument against wearing תכלת on our ציצית, as well as the weakness of the argument, in my opinion. (There are more arguments in both directions, but it would make this post way too long if I cited everything.)

R' Soloveitchik defines, in one of his Yahrtzeit Shiurim for his father*, two aspects of מסורה, which he summarizes in the following short paragraph:

שתי מסורות ישנן: א) מסורה אחת המתיחסת כולה למסורה של לימוד, ויכוח, משא ומתן והוראה שכלית, זה אומר כך וזה אומר כך, זה נותן טעם לדבריו וזה נותן טעם לדבריו, ועומדין למנין, כמו שהתורה מציירת לנו בפרשת זקן ממרא. ב) מסורת מעשית של הנהגת כלל ישראל בקיום מצוות וזו מיסדת על הפסוק שאל אביך ויגדך זקניך ויאמרו לך". (שיעורים לזכר אבא מרי ז"ל חלק א' עמ' רמ"ט)

There are two [types] of Tradition: 1) One type of tradition relates entirely to the tradition of learning and intellectual arguments. This one says this, and the other says this. This one gives his reasoning, and the other gives his reasoning. The matter is put to vote [in the Sanhedrin], just as the Torah puts forth in the portion of the Zaken Mamre. 2) The active tradition of the practices of Jewry in keeping the Commandments. This [type of tradition] is based on the verse, "Ask your father and he will tell you, your elders and they will say to you".

Based upon these two ideas of Tradition, R' Soloveitchik quotes his grandfather, and namesake, the Bais Halevi, in his opposition to the תכלת of the Radziner Rebbe, which was derived from the cuttlefish (which you can see at The Aquarium in Toronto). There are two versions of the opposition of the Bais Halevi. R' Soloveitchik quotes his grandfather as follows:

"ידוע מה שאירע בין זקני הגאון רבי יוסף דוב הלוי ובין האדמו"ר הגאון מראדזין בנוגע לתכלת שבציצית, שהרבי מראדזין חידשה וציוה לכל חסידיו להטיל תכלת בציציותיהן. האדמו"ר ניסה להוכיח על יסוד הרבה ראיות כי הצבע הזה הוא באמת התכלת. רבי יוסף דוב טען כנגד ואמר שאין ראיות וסברות יכולות להוכיח שום דבר במילי דשייכי למסורת של שאל אביך ויגדך. שם אין הסברא מכריעה כי אם המסורת עצמה. כך ראו אבות וכך היו נוהגים וכך צריכים לנהוג הבנים". (שם)

"The matter between my grandfather, R' Yosef Dov Halevi and the Admor from Radzin regarding Techeles is known. The Rebbe of Radzin introduced and commanded his Chasidim to wear Techeles on their Tziztis. The Rebbe performed tests and brought many proofs that this dye is the authentic Techeles. R' Yosef Dov argued against him, and said that proofs and logic are not valid in deciding any matters that depend upon the tradition of "Ask your father and he will tell you". In this realm, logic can not be the deciding factor, rather, only tradition itself. This is how we saw our fathers, this is what we do and this is how the sons must do." (Ibid.)

However, some points can be made:

1. How do we know that the identity of תכלת is dependent upon the tradition of שאל אביך ויגדך? Perhaps it falls under the umbrella of  the tradition of learning and intellectual argument, where logic and proofs are certainly acceptable. In fact, the מהרי"ל explicitly considers the possibility of rediscovering תכלת in שו"ת מהרי"ל החדשות סימן ה, as does the חמדת שלמה in אבן העזר סימן ט. One can find others who implicitly state that תכלת may be rediscovered.
2. A similar case can be made to forbid eating turkey, as we do not have a מסורה that turkey is a kosher bird. Yet most people eat turkey based on the fact that it has the signs of a kosher bird.

Regarding the second point, R' Herschel Shechter is apparently inconsistent. I am told that he does not eat turkey, consistent with R' Soloveitchik's argument, yet on the other hand, he wears Techeles. Perhaps he is choosing to be מחמיר in both cases. With turkey, he is מחמיר not to partake, because there is no מסורה. But with תכלת, although the מסורה would exempt him, he wishes to be מחמיר and wear תכלת based on proofs and logical argument.

R' Soloveitchik himself may have been inconsistent here, though I don't really know if he ever ate turkey or not. (I was once pressured by my peers to ask R' Ilson about R' Soloveichik's opinion of celebrating Thanksgiving in America. His answer was, "What do you care? You're Canadian!", to which laughter from the audience ensued.) I have heard that R' Soloveitchik personally ate turkey, though I have not confirmed that. If that is the case, then R' Soloveitchik understood that the מסורה of kosher animals falls under his first definition of tradition, which is subject to halachik argument, whereas the identity of תכלת falls under the second definition of tradition. On what basis did he make this distinction? [edit: see my father's suggestion in the endnotes, here.]

Finally, what exactly the Bais Halevi meant when he said that תכלת is dependent upon the מסורה, is a matter of dispute. In a letter cited in one of the Radziner Rebbe's seforim on תכלת**, the argument is presented in a slightly different fashion. There he argues not that it is impossible to rediscover תכלת without a מסורה. Rather, he argues that there is a negative-מסורה on the cuttlefish. His reasoning is that the cuttlefish was not a newly discovered fish, and it was well known throughout the generations. Yet, it was never used to produce תכלת dye for ציצית. Therefore, he argues, it is as though we have a מסורה that the cuttlefish is not the חלזון, for otherwise we would have been using it for centuries. (Perhaps the Bais Halevi used both arguments, so the two are not necessarily contradictory.) This argument would seemingly not apply to the most common תכלת dye nowadays, which comes from the Murex Trunculus snail, a snail that was not readily available since the time of the Gemara (and even then, it became scarce already by the days of אביי ורבא).

* Should be required reading for every yeshiva student. Woe is to me for being born too late to attend the shiurim in person!
** I don't have the Radziner's seforim at home, so I am relying on its citation in קונטרס חותם של זהב and others.

Excessive Praise and Narcissism

Here is an excerpt from a Scientific American article that I saw linked somewhere, titled "Too Much Praise Promotes Narcissism":

"Two prominent but nearly opposing schools of thought address how narcissism develops. The first attributes extreme self-love to a lack of affection from parents; the other implicates moms and dads who place their children on a pedestal by lavishing them with praise."

R' Chaim Kanievsky, in his section on Chinuch in ארחות יושר weighs in on the matter:

והורים שמכניסין בלב בניהם שהם בעלי כשרון ומצוינים והם מהכי טובים ומוצלחים אע"ג זה נכון ואע"ג שכונתם לטובה כדי לזרזם ללמוד אעפ"כ יצא שכרם בהפסדם כי מכניסין בלבם גאוה ומדות רעות וגורמין שמתנכלים לחבריהם ופוגעין בהן וסופן שיהיו שנואין מכולם. והנערים האלו כשנכנסין אח"כ לישיבה ושם יש הרבה טובים מהם ואין מסתכלין עליהם כמו שהיו רגילין נכנסין למשבר כידוע, ומהם מפסיקין ללמוד, ומהם נכנסין לשגעון וכו' כידוע כל זה, ואח"כ יש מהם צרות צרורות...

"And parents who instill in their children that they are geniuses and among the best and most succesful, even if it is true, and even if their intent is pure, to encourage them to learn, nevertheless the negatives outweighs the positives. For they instill in their children haughtiness and [other] poor character traits, and they cause their children to look down upon others. In the end, they will be the most hated. And when the child enters Yeshiva (I think he means high school, or post-high school. A.J.), and discovers that there are students much stronger than him, and they pay him none of the attention that he is accustomed to receiving, he becomes broken, as is known. Some of them stop learning altogether, and others become depressed etc. as is known. Afterwards they will have great troubles..."

R' Chaim quotes no sources for this, which is quite noteworthy, for if you were to peruse through ארחות יושר, you would notice that he rarely makes an original comment. It is mostly a compendium of sources from Chazal, Rishonim and some Achronim on various topics, with perhaps a line here and there from R' Chaim himself. But in this paragraph he quotes nobody.

What does Scientific American conclude?

"In a March issue of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, the Dutch researchers report that children of excessively praising parents were more likely to score high on narcissistic qualities but not on self-esteem. They also found that lack of parental warmth showed no such link to narcissism."

"The correlation shows that positive feedback should be tied to good behavior in a child rather than piled on indiscriminately, says psychologist Luke Hyde of the University of Michigan, who did not participate in the work. A 2008 meta-analysis of 85 studies showed that narcissism is on the rise in young adults in the West, which could stem in part from a cultural emphasis on praise, with the goal of boosting high self-esteem, notes Eddie Brummelman, lead author of the PNAS paper. 'It might be well intended,' he adds, 'but it actually backfires.'" 

So while praise is intended to boost self-esteem, excessive praise moves out of the realm of self-esteem and into the realm of narcissism. At first glance this seems indicative of the Rambam's "golden middle road", always keeping character traits in check, and never straying to the extremes. But a second glance is necessary, as it is unclear exactly what the Rambam's stance is when it comes to גאוה and ענוה. (See הלכות דעות פרק א, ובלחם משנה שם, וראה גם בהקדמה למס' אבות פרק ד)

The Rambam's Fifth Principle - Part 2

In part one of this series, I set out to demonstrate the differing opinions of the Rambam and Rav Sherira Gaon with respect to the permissibility of praying to מלאכים, or even just using them as intermediaries between ourselves and God. Rav Sherira Gaon maintains that מלאכים have free will, and as such, one may make certain requests of them. The Rambam vehemently disagrees, and considers one of the fundamental principles of Judaism that it is forbidden to address prayers to any being besides God. (The Rambam does ascribe some sort of free will to מלאכים, see מורה נבוכים חלק ב' פרק ד. Perhaps I will post about this in the future. Nevertheless, he maintains that it is forbidden to pray to them, the reasons of which will follow.)

As to why the Rambam considers this principle to be so important, I have already cited the view of R' Yitzchak Abarbanel (ראש אמנה פרק יב), that directing prayers to God alone, and not through the medium of מלאכים or other intermediaries, underscores three fundamental ideas:

• There is no comparison between God's existence and the existence of the celestial beings - the latter follow their inherent nature and do not have any personal free will (with regard to what exactly that means, see מורה נבוכים שם), whereas God is the Ultimate פועל המציאות, creating and destroying at will. 
• God is the בעל היכולת, of which there is no other like Him in the universe. The ability to answer prayers rests solely in the "hands of God", and it therefore only makes sense to pray directly to Him, and not via any intermediaries. (Lest you interject - but maybe we, as mere mortals, are not worthy of addressing God directly, and therefore we need to make use of מלאכים. I already explained this when I spoke at the Young Israel of Riverdale. If you were not there, you will need to wait until I get around to writing about נבואה.) 
• The divine providence granted to the Jewish nation differs greatly from that of the nations of the world. Each nation has been delegated a "שר הממונה עליהם" - a מלאך that is in charge of their affairs. The Jewish nation, on the other hand, is placed directly under the providence of God. 

According to Abarbanel, because of these fundamental ideas that are essentially encapsulated in the Rambam's fifth principle, it is fitting to be included in the 13 principles of faith. However, I believe that a reading of the Rambam's words in הלכות עבודה זרה will add to our understanding of the importance of the fifth principle.

רמב"ם פ"א מהל' עבודה זרה ה"א וז"ל בימי אנוש טעו בני האדם טעות גדולה, ונבערה עצת חכמי אותו הדור, ואנוש עצמו מן הטועים. וזו היתה טעותם. אמרו הואיל והאל ברא כוכבים אלו וגלגלים להנהיג את העולם ונתנם במרום וחלק להם כבוד, והם שמשים המשמשים לפניו, ראויים הם לשבחם ולפארם ולחלוק להם כבוד. וזהו רצון האל ברוך הוא לגדל ולכבד מי שגדלו וכבדו, כמו שהמלך רוצה לכבד עבדיו והעומדים לפניו וזה הוא כבודו של מלך. כיון שעלה דבר זה על לבם התחילו לבנות לכוכבים היכלות ולהקריב להם קרבנות ולשבחם ולפארם בדברים ולהשתחוות למולן כדי להשיג רצון הבורא בדעתם הרעה. וזה היה עיקר עבודה זרה כו' עכ"ל.

"In the days of Enosh the people had made a grave error... They said, 'because God created the stars and spheres in order to control the the universe, and he put them in the lofty [heavens] and accorded them honour, and they are like servants before Him, it is proper to praise and give honour to them... similar to a king who wishes to honour his servants... for this is the honour of the king.' Once these thoughts had entered their hearts, the people began to build sanctuaries for the stars, and to bring sacrifices before them... And this is the foundation of Avoda Zara"

The Rambam, in these words, has set down for us his impetus for counting the prohibition of directing prayers to מלאכים and the like as one of the fundamental principles of Judaism. Regardless of the good intentions of those who pray to מלאכים, ultimately, it bears credence to עבודה זרה. Or, to be more accurate, it is the essential foundation for all עבודה זרה. 

R' Yosef Albo, in the beginning of ספר העיקרים, is mystified - why did the Rambam count praying to מלאכים as an עיקר? Granted, he says, it is certainly included in לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים, but why should it be considered one of the fundamental principles of faith? In light of these words of the Rambam, it is quite the opposite - we are not dealing with a מצות לא תעשה that was "mistakenly" counted as an עיקר - rather, the very לאו of לא יהיה לך is defined by the יסוד החמישי. Addressing prayers to מלאכים does not merely lead to עבודה זרה - it is עבודה זרה.

It was pointed out to me that the Rambam takes this one step further, when discussing the confrontation between אברהם אבינו and his opponents:

רמב"ם פ"א מהל' עבודה זרה ה"ג וז"ל שאין ראוי לעבוד אלא לאלוה העולם ולו ראוי להשתחוות ולהקריב ולנסך כדי שיכירוהו כל הברואים הבאים, וראוי לאבד ולשבר כל הצורות כדי שלא יטעו בהן כל העם כמו אלו שהם מדמים שאין שם אלוה אלא אלו עכ"ל.

"For it is only proper to serve the God of the universe. To Him it is proper to bow and sacrifice and pour [wine libations] in order for all the creations to recognize Him. And it is proper to destroy all of the forms [idols] in order that people should not err, like those who think there is no god but these [idols]"

Here we find two dimensions to the argument of אברהם אבינו. First, it is necessary to destroy all remnants of foreign gods, in order that people should not stray from the true path. However, besides for this, we are taught one more thing worth thinking about - the reason we serve Hashem, is to recognize Him. We don't offer sacrifices because God likes the way they smell and taste, and He doesn't care for our wine either. We serve God because the only way for man to connect to God is through serving Him. And that's why we are commanded to refrain from setting up intermediaries - because otherwise our connection to God would no longer be direct.